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Abstract
1 This article is devoted to the study of methods to change defeasible logic programs
(de.l.p.s) which are the knowledge bases used by the Defeasible Logic Programming
(DeLP) interpreter. DeLP is an argumentation formalism that allows to reason over
potentially inconsistent de.l.p.s. Argument Theory Change (ATC) studies certain aspects
of belief revision in order to make them suitable for abstract argumentation systems. In
this article, abstract arguments are rendered concrete by using the particular rule-based
defeasible logic adopted by DeLP. The objective of our proposal is to define prioritized
argument revision operators a` la ATC for de.l.p.s, in such a way that the newly inserted
argument ends up undefeated after the revision, thus warranting its conclusion. In order to
ensure this warrant, the de.l.p. has to be changed in concordance with a minimal change
principle. To this end, we discuss different minimal change criteria that could be adopted.
Finally, an algorithm is presented, implementing the argument revision operations.
KEYWORDS: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Logic Programming, Belief Re-
vision, Argumentation, Non-monotonic Reasoning.
1 Introduction and Background
The integration of Logic Programming and Defeasible Reasoning has produced sev-
eral Knowledge Representation and Reasoning tools (Garc´ıa et al. 2009). Among
them, Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) (Garc´ıa and Simari 2004) has been
extensively studied and developed in several applications like (Rotstein et al. 2007;
Garc´ıa et al. 2007; Chesn˜evar et al. 2007; Thimm and Kern-Isberner 2008; Black and Hunter 2009;
Go´mez et al. 2010), among others. DeLP combines an extended Logic Program-
ming representation language with a dialectical procedure applied to the relevant
arguments to obtain the supported conclusions (see Section 3.2).
By choosing DeLP as our formalism, we follow a defeasible form of reasoning
1 To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
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over potentially inconsistent knowledge bases (KBs). Here, the notion of warrant
in argumentation plays the role of the consequence relation: the warranting process
evaluates conflicting pieces of knowledge deciding which ones prevail despite the
existence of beliefs in opposition. A warrant is also identified as the argument’s ac-
ceptance criterion corresponding to the adopted argumentative semantics. Among
the most influential works on argumentation semantics, we may refer to those over
graphs of arguments (Dung 1995), and more recently (Baroni and Giacomin 2007).
However, the argumentation semantics we adopt follows the idea of dialectical argu-
mentation (Prakken and Vreeswijk 2000; Chesn˜evar et al. 2000): arguments trees,
namely dialectical trees, are built from the argumentation framework with nodes as
arguments and edges as attacks, which stand for sources of inconsistency obtained
from the KB. The use of dialectical trees allows to concentrate only on a specific
query to build “on demand” only those arguments that are somehow related to the
query. This kind of semantics allows to construct practical approaches, avoiding the
analysis of the complete graph of arguments.
Belief revision (Alchourro´n et al. 1985; Hansson 1999) studies the dynamics of
knowledge, coping with the problem of how to change the information standing for
the conceptualization of a modeled world, to reflect its evolution. Revisions, as the
most important change operations, concentrate on the incorporation of new beliefs
and their interaction with older ones. A basic set of postulates is usually specified to
characterize a rational behavior of the proposed change operations. Among them,
minimal change and success have concentrated much research. Success specifies the
main objective of the change operation (in the case of revisions, the inference of
the new belief to incorporate). On the other hand, minimal change ensures that
the least possible amount of information is modified in order to achieve success.
Argument Theory Change (ATC) (Rotstein et al. 2008) applies belief revision
concepts to the field of abstract argumentation (Dung 1995). (In abstract argu-
mentation, the logic for arguments and their inner structure is abstracted away.)
The main contribution provided by ATC is a revision operator at argument level
that revises a theory by an argument seeking for its warrant. To such end, the
theory –and thus the set of arguments obtained from it– is modified in order to
guarantee success: the new argument should be accepted by the argumentation se-
mantics. Consequently, different criteria of minimal change should be considered
to guarantee a rational behavior of the operator proposed. Among the most rele-
vant uses of ATC, we may refer to hypothetical reasoning, dynamics in negotiation,
persuasion, dialogues, strategies, planning, judicial contexts in law, and more.
In this article we apply ATC to handle KBs’ dynamics. More specifically, we rely
on ATC to make evolve potentially inconsistent KBs without consistency restora-
tion. To such end, we reify the abstract theory of ATC into a particular sort of
KBs: defeasible logic programs (de.l.p.s), which are managed by the Defeasible
Logic Programming (DeLP) formalism2(Garc´ıa and Simari 2004). DeLP is a rule-
based argumentation formalism in which arguments are built from a subset of rules
2 The DeLP interpreter is available online at http://lidia.cs.uns.edu.ar/delp client
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to infer claims. A preliminary approach on the matter of revising de.l.p.s through
ATC was introduced in (Moguillansky et al. 2008).
The definition of a revision operator over a KB within the classic theory of belief
revision usually involves the removal of beliefs from the KB in such a way that a new
belief could be consistently incorporated afterwards. Consequently, the new belief
ends up inferred by the resulting KB in a consistent manner. In some cases it is nec-
essary to reverse the order in which the revision operator is defined (Hansson 1993).
That is, the new belief is incorporated possibly introducing an inconsistent inter-
mediate state to the KB, restoring the consistency afterwards by a series of belief
removals. Such reversion is used to define the ATC’s argument revision. This is
necessary, given that in order to pursue warrant of the new argument, its inter-
action with other arguments from the worked argumentation system needs to be
analyzed. Thus, we first incorporate the new argument into the worked set of ar-
guments. However, we are not concerned about the appearance of an intermediate
inconsistent state –as is the case in classic belief revision– but on an intermediate
state in which the acceptance of the new argument is not provided. In such a case,
ATC provides the necessary elements to change the theory to finally accept the new
argument.
Analogously to the usual definition of a revision operator, in which a belief is
added to the KB, in the argumentative model of change that we propose, a belief
is added to a de.l.p. along with the argument that supports it. (An argument is
said to support a belief, namely the claim, by considering a minimal set of beliefs
inferring it.) In order to accept the new belief by the argumentation semantics, we
pursue warrant of the argument supporting such belief. In consequence, the revision
theory proposes additional modifications to the program (if necessary) altering the
set of arguments that originally interfered with the warrant of the new argument.
The theory of change here proposed is inspired from the AGMmodel (Alchourro´n et al. 1985).
Due to the usage of argumentation as the base formalism, ATC has to deal with ad-
ditional, inherent complications arising from the interaction of arguments through-
out the warrant process. Chained removal of arguments and undesirable side effects
bring about even more difficulty. Moreover, considering warrant as a notion of con-
sequence, ATC also has to take into account non-monotonicity, which is not present
when revision is performed over classical logic. Throughout the paper it will be clear
that this fact implies a greater amount of theoretical elements, hence the conceptual
and notational difficulty is consequently increased.
This article provides a practical approach towards implementing ATC through
DeLP. To this end, a prolog-like algorithm is given, which manipulates rules from
a de.l.p. following ATC definitions. The reader should be aware that this article does
not pursue a full formalization according to the classical theory of belief revision.
Thus, no representation theorems are to be defined here. Instead, we look at the
process of change from the argumentation standpoint taking into account the usual
principles of minimal change and success. The full axiomatic characterization of
ATC exceeds the scope of this article, however, the interested reader could refer
to (Moguillansky et al. 2011) for ATC’s full characterization applied for handling
dynamics of knowledge/arguments in propositional bases/argumentation.
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This article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some real examples in
which ATC may bring an novel alternative to handle dynamics of knowledge in
inconsistent bases. Section 3 introduces the necessary background upon which our
theory relies. Section 3.1, gives a very brief intuition about belief revision, and Sec-
tion 3.2 describes in a slightly deeper way the DeLP formalism. Section 4 provides
a detailed study on the adopted argumentation semantics, i.e., dialectical trees, and
their characteristics regarding non-acceptance (rejection) of arguments. Section 5
details the complete ATC theory concentrating on its basic elements (Sect. 5.1),
identifying the portions of dialectical trees to be changed and putting particular
attention on the minimal change principle (Sect. 5.2 and Sect. 5.3), and providing
the argument change operators (Sect. 5.4). In Section 6, some algorithms are given
towards a full implementation of this theory upon DeLP. Related work is discussed
in Section 7, and finally, Section 8 points out some final remarks.
2 Motivation
Dealing with inconsistencies is of utmost importance in areas like medicine and law.
For instance, in law trials, two parties to a dispute present contradictory information
in a tribunal, standing in favor or against the dispute (in criminal trials this is
normally the presumption of innocence). The tribunal decision resolves afterwards
the dispute upon presented evidence. This shows the need to consider some kind
of paraconsistent semantics in order to appropriately reason over KBs containing
contradictory information.
For some settings, it will be also necessary to provide services for handling dy-
namics of knowledge with capabilities to tolerate inconsistencies from the KB under
consideration. An interesting one arises in promulgation of laws. This usually in-
volves a long process in which articles and principles from previous laws, and even
evidence taken from the current state of affairs, may enter in conflict with articles
composing the new law. Imagine a base containing knowledge about the complete
legal system of a nation, including the National Constitution, the international law,
and other political fundamental principles –such as the civil and penal codes, and
other minor local laws. Such KB is required to evolve in a way that it incorporates
the information conforming the new law, ensuring it to be constitutional. To this
end, it is necessary to identify a set of articles and/or principles to be derogated,
or amended, as part of the process of promulgation.
As an example, we will refer in a very brief manner to the Argentinean broadcast-
ing media law reformed during 2009. The previous media law, promulgated by the
latter de facto regime, empowered the government to regulate the different media
allowing total control of news. When democracy was restituted, the regulation of
media was extended to private investment groups. As years went by, these groups
took over majorities of types of media, conforming monopolies in some cases. This
brought excessive power to groups with partial interests, allowing them to ma-
nipulate the social opinion about the actual government, and even to condition
politicians, thus striking to national sovereignty. Article 161 of the new media law
became one of the most controversial points, since it forces monopolistic enterprises
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to get rid of part of their assets in a maximum period of one year. Some enterprises
warned that they would be forced to sell off their assets at very low prices. This
violates article 17 of the National Constitution which speaks about private prop-
erty rights. Moreover, some members of the Supreme Court think that article 161
recalls the control over the media exercised by totalitarian regimes, which would
violate article 1 of the National Constitution. In fact, such situation could evolve to
a distrust state on the principle of legal security. These are just some of the contro-
versial points for which the new media law keeps being studied by the Argentinean
parliament at the time of this submission.
Belief revision studies the dynamics of knowledge relying upon consistency restora-
tion. That is, change is applied through change operations like revisions, by ensuring
a consistent resulting base. Observe however, that for the aforementioned case of
promulgation of laws, it is mandatory to keep most inconsistencies from the original
KB to make it evolve appropriately. This led us to investigate new approaches of
belief revision which operate over paraconsistent semantics in order to avoid con-
sistency restoration. Argument Theory Change (ATC) arises with such objective,
applying belief revision to argumentation systems.
Among the most relevant uses of ATC, we may refer to hypothetical reasoning,
dynamics in negotiation, persuasion, dialogues, strategies, planning, and more. For
instance, in scheduling, consider the development of a company’s task scheduler.
Assume employee assignments are managed by an agent interpreting a KB. The
central authority incorporates new tasks to the KB. An agent uses this information
to decide to which employees should the new requirements be assigned. Argumen-
tation could deal with such a problem since it would be necessary to reason over
inconsistency: conflicts would appear between the relevance of tasks and employees
availability. A new task with a high level of relevance could be sent to a specific
employee for a matter of trust, provoking the reallocation of his previous tasks
to other employees. ATC can be useful to implement the re-scheduling process by
recognizing how new assignments are in conflict with preexisting ones.
It is important to mention that, unlike typical KB revision models in which a
base is revised by a sentence, here we are concerned with the operation of revising
a de.l.p. by a given argument. This could be a good alternative to revise a KB by a
piece of information of higher conceptual complexity. For instance, considering the
example given before on promulgation of laws, an ATC model could revise the legal
system by including an argument standing for the new law to be promulgated. In
this case, arguments to be removed from the original argumentation system would
contain different articles from preexisting laws. Thus, the new law is ensured to
be constitutional by proposing to derogate other laws or amend them by removing
specific articles which are part of arguments to be removed. Naturally, removals
from the base are expected to be of less importance than the one for the new law.
That is, laws to be amended should never correspond to the National Constitution
unless the promulgation of the new law is expected to reform it. In case no minor
laws arise to be amended, it is clear that the new one cannot be included as it is
and thus, it necessarily needs to be modified to be accepted by the legal system.
6 Moguillansky, Rotstein, Falappa, Garc´ıa and Simari
3 Overviews
In this section we give an overview of the necessary theoretical background for
the ATC machinery. Firstly some elements of the classic belief revision theory are
introduced, and afterwards we present the main definitions of DeLP.
3.1 Belief Revision Overview
Belief revision studies the process of changing beliefs from an epistemic state
to accept new information. An epistemic state –to which change operations are
applicable– accounts for knowledge in the form of either a belief base or a belief
set. A belief base (knowledge base) is an epistemic state represented by a set of
sentences not necessarily closed under logical consequence. On the other hand, a
belief set is a set of sentences closed under logical consequence. In general, a belief
set is infinite, being this the main reason of the impossibility to deal with this kind
of sets in a computer. Instead, it is possible to characterize the properties that each
change operation should satisfy on any finite representation of an epistemic state.
The classic change operations as seen in the AGM model of theory change
(Alchourro´n et al. 1985) –named after their proponents Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors,
and Makinson– are known as expansions, contractions, and revisions. An expansion
incorporates a new belief without guaranteeing a consistent resulting epistemic
state. A contraction eliminates a belief α, and other beliefs making possible its
inference, from the epistemic state. Finally, a revision adds a new belief α to the
epistemic state guaranteeing a consistent outcome always that α is consistent as
well. This means that the revision includes a new belief and possibly eliminates
others in order to avoid inconsistencies. Revisions are usually defined by means
of contractions and expansions: assuming a revision operator “∗”, a new belief α,
and an epistemic state K; the resulting epistemic state K ∗ α is ensured to be
consistent (unless α is inconsistent) through a contraction “−” by the complement
of the new belief (i.e., ∼α) and an expansion “+” by α. If the epistemic state
does not imply ∼α, then α can be incorporated without loss of consistency. This
composition of sub-operations defines a revision operator through the Levi identity:
K ∗α = (K−∼α)+α (Levi 1977; Ga¨rdenfors 1981). In (Hansson 1993) the reverse
of this identity was studied. This will be helpful for the definition of the model of
change proposed here.
The changes applied to the epistemic state might conform to the minimal change
principle. This notion is one of the rationality principles of change. Furthermore,
these principles are formalized through a set of rationality postulates which are used
to guarantee that a change operation behaves in a rational manner. In this paper we
concentrate on the specification of the model of change, and only two principles will
be taken into account: minimal change and success –a successful revision operation
refers to the primacy of new information.
The AGM model of change specifies an array of theoretical tools to perform
revision over belief sets. Nonetheless, since in this work we aim at performing
change over defeasible logic programs –which can be seen as a kind of belief bases–
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we preferred to rely on Hansson’s kernel sets (Hansson 1994) which were pro-
posed to deal with practical approaches. A kernel set is a minimal set of beliefs
inferring α (namely, an α-kernel) from the epistemic state. The kernel contrac-
tion (Hansson 1994) –applicable both to belief bases and belief sets– specifies an
operator capable of selecting and eliminating beliefs from each α-kernel in K, in
order to avoid inferring α. The relation between the notions of kernel sets and
arguments will be clear in the following section.
3.2 Defeasible Logic Programming Overview
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) combines results of logic programming and
defeasible argumentation. A brief description of DeLP is included below –for a
detailed presentation see (Garc´ıa and Simari 2004). A defeasible logic program (or
de.l.p. for short) is a finite set of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. Facts are
ground literals representing atomic information or the negation of atomic informa-
tion using the strong negation “∼”. Strict rules represent non-defeasible informa-
tion noted as β0← β1, . . . , βn, where βi for i ≥ 0 is a ground literal. Defeasible rules
represent tentative information noted as β0 –≺β1, . . . , βn, where βi for i ≥ 0 is a
ground literal. The particular case of a defeasible rule with empty body is called a
presumption. A query is a ground literal that can be posed to a de.l.p. to find out
whether it is warranted. The domain of all defeasible rules is denoted as Ld, and
that containing all the strict rules and facts, as Ls.
When required, a de.l.p. P is denoted (Π,∆), distinguishing the subset Π of facts
and strict rules, and the subset ∆ of defeasible rules (see Example 1), however, such
a distinction is not mandatory for representing de.l.p.s, being also correct the use
of a common set of facts, strict rules, and defeasible rules.
Example 1 Consider the de.l.p. P1 = (Π1,∆1):
Π1=
{
t, z,
(p← t)
}
∆1=


(∼a –≺y), (y –≺x), (x –≺z),
(y –≺p), (a –≺w), (w –≺y),
(∼w –≺ t), (∼x –≺ t), (x –≺p)


InDeLP, literals can be derived from rules and facts, being a defeasible derivation
one that uses, at least, a single defeasible rule; and a strict derivation one that only
uses strict rules or facts. Strong negation is allowed in the head of program rules, and
hence may be used to represent contradictory knowledge. We say that two literals
are contradictory if they are complementary with respect to strong negation (e.g., a
and ∼a). Hence, a set of rules and facts is contradictory if two contradictory literals
can be derived from it. It is important to note that the set Π (which is used to
represent non-defeasible information) must possess certain internal coherence, and
therefore, Π must be a non-contradictory set. However, from a program (Π,∆),
contradictory literals could be derived by using both kinds of rules, e.g., from
(Π1,∆1) of Example 1 it is possible to defeasibly derive a and ∼a.
DeLP incorporates an argumentation formalism for the treatment of contradic-
tory knowledge that can be defeasibly derived. This formalism allows the identifica-
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tion of contradictory pieces of knowledge, where a dialectical process decides which
information prevails as warranted. This dialectical process involves the construction
and evaluation of arguments that either support or interfere with the query under
analysis. From a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆), an argument 〈A, α〉 is conformed by a minimal
set A ⊆ ∆ of defeasible rules that, along with the set Π of strict rules and facts
from P, is not contradictory and derives a certain conclusion α.
Definition 1 (Argument Structure) Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p., 〈A, α〉 is an
argument structure for a ground literal α from P, if A is a minimal set of
defeasible rules (A ⊆ ∆) such that:
1. there exists a derivation for α from Π ∪ A, and
2. the set Π ∪ A is non-contradictory.
The domain of all argument structures from P is denoted ArgsP . If 〈A, α〉 is an
argument structure we will also say that A is an argument, and that A supports α.
Example 2 From P1 in Example 1, we can build the following arguments:
〈B1,∼a〉 = 〈{∼a –≺y,y –≺x,x –≺ z},∼a〉
〈B2,∼a〉 = 〈{∼a –≺y,y –≺p},∼a〉
〈B3, a〉 = 〈{a –≺w,w –≺y,y –≺p}, a〉
〈B4,∼w〉 = 〈{∼w –≺ t},∼w〉
〈B5,∼x〉 = 〈{∼x –≺ t},∼x〉
〈B6, x〉 = 〈{x –≺p}, x〉
A DeLP-query α succeeds, i.e., it is warranted from a program P , if it is possible
to build an argument A that supports α and A is found to be undefeated by
the warrant procedure. This process implements an exhaustive dialectical analysis
that involves the construction and evaluation of arguments that either support or
interfere with the query under analysis. That is, given an argument A that supports
α, the warrant procedure will evaluate if there are other arguments that counter-
argue or attack A or a sub-argument of A (C is a sub-argument of A if C ⊆ A). An
argument 〈B, β〉 is a defeater (or counter-argument) for 〈A, α〉 at literal β ifA∪B∪Π
is contradictory; that is, if there exists a sub-argument 〈A′, α′〉 of 〈A, α〉 such that
α′ and β disagree. Two literals disagree when there exist two contradictory literals
that have a strict derivation from Π ∪ {α′, β}. The literal α′ is referred to as the
counter-argument point and 〈A′, α′〉 as the disagreement sub-argument.
Proposition 1 For any de.l.p. P and any argument 〈A, α〉 ∈ ArgsP , if A = ∅ then
〈A, α〉 has no defeaters from P.
Proof: Since 〈A, α〉 ∈ ArgsP and A = ∅, from Def. 1 we have that Π derives α.
By reductio ad absurdum, let us assume that there is an argument 〈B, β〉 ∈ ArgsP
such that B defeats A, hence A ∪ B ∪ Π is contradictory (see counter-argument).
Afterwards, since A = ∅, we have A∪B∪Π = B ∪Π. This is absurd, since B is not
compliant with cond. 1 in Def. 1. Finally, 〈A, α〉 has no defeaters from P . 
To establish if A is a non-defeated argument, defeaters for A are considered. A
Dynamics of Knowledge in DeLP through Argument Theory Change 9
counter-argument D is a proper defeater for A if D is preferred to A, or it is a
blocking defeater if they either have the same strength or are incomparable with
respect to the preference criterion used. It is important to note that in DeLP the
argument comparison criterion is modular and thus, the most appropriate criterion
for the domain that is being represented can be selected. Nevertheless, in the exam-
ples given in this paper we will abstract away from this criterion, since it introduces
unnecessary complexity. Thus, preference between counter-arguments will be given
explicitly by enumerating defeats between arguments.
Since defeaters are arguments, there may exist defeaters for them, and defeaters
for these defeaters, and so on. This will determine sequences of arguments which
are referred to as argumentation lines.
Definition 2 (Argumentation Line) Given a de.l.p. P, and arguments B1, . . . ,
Bn from ArgsP , an argumentation line λ is any (non-empty) finite sequence
[B1, . . . ,Bn] such that Bi is a defeater of Bi−1, for 1 < i ≤ n. We will say that λ is
rooted in B1, and that Bn is the leaf of λ.
Since argumentation lines are an exchange of opposing arguments, we could think
of it as two parties engaged in a dispute, which we call pro and con.
Definition 3 (Set of Con (Pro) Arguments) Given an argumentation line λ,
the set of con (resp., pro) arguments λ− (resp., λ+) of λ is the set containing
all the arguments placed on even (resp., odd) positions in λ.
To avoid undesirable sequences that may represent circular or fallacious reasoning
chains, in DeLP an argumentation line has to be acceptable: it has to be finite, an
argument cannot appear twice, there cannot be two consecutive blocking defeaters,
and the set of pro (resp., con) arguments has to be non-contradictory, i.e., the
set of defeasible rules from the union of arguments inside the set of pro (resp.,
con), along with Π, does not yield a contradiction. The domain of all acceptable
argumentation lines in P is denoted as LinesP . An acceptable argumentation line in
a program P is called exhaustive if no more arguments from P can be added to the
sequence without compromising the acceptability of the line. For more details on
acceptability of argumentation lines, refer to (Garc´ıa and Simari 2004). The domain
of all acceptable and exhaustive argumentation lines in P is denoted as ALinesP .
Remark 1 Given a de.l.p. P, ALinesP ⊆ LinesP holds.
Example 3 Consider the arguments from Ex. 2, and the following defeat relations:
B3 is a proper defeater for B2, and B4 properly defeats B3. From these three argu-
ments we can build the sequence [B2,B3,B4], which is an acceptable and exhaustive
argumentation line: it is non-circular, finite, it does not include blocking defeats,
B2 ∪ B4 ∪ Π1 is non-contradictory, and no more defeaters can be attached to it.
Next we introduce the notion of upper segment, which identifies subsequences
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of an argumentation line, from the root to a specific argument in it, determin-
ing new (non-exhaustive) argumentation lines. This notion will be central in the
argumentative model of change presented in this article.
Definition 4 (Upper Segment) Given a de.l.p. P, and an acceptable argumen-
tation line λ ∈ LinesP such that λ = [B1, . . . ,Bn]; the upper segment of λ wrt. Bi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is defined as λ↑[Bi] = [B1, . . . ,Bi], while the proper upper segment
of λ wrt. Bi is defined as λ↑(Bi) = [B1, . . . ,Bi−1]. The proper upper segment of λ
wrt. B1 is undefined, noted as λ↑(B1) = ǫ.
In the sequel, we refer to both proper and non-proper upper segments simply as
“upper segment” and either usage is distinguishable through its notation (round or
square brackets, respectively). As stated next, the upper segment of an argument in
a line constitutes a (possibly non-exhaustive) argumentation line by itself. Besides,
given a line λ = [B1, . . . ,Bj , . . . ,Bn], we will say that an argument Bi is below
(respectively, above) Bj iff j > i (respectively, i > j).
Proposition 2 For any λ ∈ LinesP and any B ∈ λ, it holds λ↑[B] ∈ LinesP .
Proof: Straightforward from Definitions 2 and 4, and the notion of acceptable
argumentation line. 
Many argumentation lines could arise from one argument, leading to a tree struc-
ture. In a dialectical tree, each node (except the root) represents a defeater of its
parent, and leaves correspond to arguments with no defeaters in the line.
Definition 5 (Dialectical Tree) Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP (A)
rooted in A is built by a set X ⊆ LinesP of lines rooted in an argument A ∈ ArgsP ,
such that an argument C in TP(A) is: (1) a node iff C ∈ λ, for any λ ∈ X;
(2) a child of a node B in TP (A) iff C ∈ λ, B ∈ λ′, for any {λ, λ′} ⊆ X, and
λ′↑[B] = λ↑(C). A leaf of any line in X is a leaf in TP(A). The domain of all
dialectical trees from P is noted as TreesP .
The set containing all the acceptable and exhaustive argumentation lines rooted
in a common argument A will determine the bundle set for A.
Definition 6 (Bundle Set) Given a de.l.p. P, a set SP (A) is the bundle set for
A from P iff SP(A) contains all the lines rooted in A from ALinesP .
The objective of a dialectical tree is to evaluate all the information that could
determine the warrant status of the root argument. In addition to this, the argu-
mentation lines included in a dialectical tree should be acceptable in order to ensure
the exchange of arguments is performed in a sensible manner. This gives place to
a restricted version of dialectical tree, called acceptable. An acceptable dialectical
tree provides a structure for considering all the possible acceptable argumentation
lines that can be generated for deciding whether its root argument is defeated.
Dynamics of Knowledge in DeLP through Argument Theory Change 11
Definition 7 (Acceptable Dialectical Tree) Given a de.l.p. P, an acceptable
dialectical tree TP(A) rooted in an argument A ∈ ArgsP is a dialectical tree
whose argumentation lines belong to the bundle set SP (A). We will say that TP (A)
is determined by SP(A), and identify the domain of all acceptable dialectical
trees from P as ATreesP .
Proposition 3 Given a de.l.p. P, ATreesP ⊆ TreesP holds.
Proof: Let TP(A) ∈ ATreesP . From Def. 7 and Def. 6, we know that every λ ∈
TP(A) is an acceptable and exhaustive line from ALinesP . Since ALinesP ⊆ LinesP ,
every such λ also belongs to LinesP and therefore, from Def. 5, TP(A) ∈ TreesP . 
From now on, every dialectical tree will be assumed acceptable unless stated
otherwise. Observe that arguments in dialectical trees will be depicted as trian-
gles (labeled with their names) and edges will denote defeat relations. Defeated
arguments will be painted in gray, whereas undefeated ones will be white.
Example 4 The dialectical tree determined by the bundle set {[A,B1,B2], [A,B1,B3],
[A,B1,B5], [A,B4,B5,B1,B3]} is depicted on the right. We assume that every defeat
is proper excepting for B5 and B1 which are blocking defeaters, as
well as B1 and B2. Observe that [A,B1,B5,B1] is not acceptable
and thus, B1 cannot be child of B5 since it was already introduced
in that line. However, nothing prevents B1 being child of B5 in
the rightmost line. Note also that, since line [A,B4,B5,B1,B2]
contains two consecutive blocking defeaters, it is not acceptable
and therefore, it does not belong to the bundle set.
Given an argument structure 〈A, α〉, to decide whether α is warranted, DeLP
follows a specific marking criterion applied over the dialectical tree TP(A). This
criterion assigns a mark from the domain {D,U} to each node in the tree, where
D stands for defeated and U for undefeated.
1. all leaves in TP (A) are marked as U ; and
2. every inner node B of TP(A) will be marked as U iff every child of B is marked
as D; otherwise, B is marked D.
Thus, an argument B will be marked as D iff it has at least one child marked as
U . Finally, if the root argument A is marked as U then we say that TP(A) warrants
α and that α is warranted from P . When no confusion arises, we will refer to A
instead of α, saying that A is warranted. We call TP (A) a warranting tree if it
warrants A, otherwise we call it a non-warranting tree. For instance, in Example 4,
argument A is warranted given that it ends up undefeated from its dialectical tree.
Example 5 From the de.l.p. (Π1,∆1) of Ex. 1 we can consider a new program
P5 = (Π1,∆1 ∪ {a –≺x}), from which we can build the arguments in Ex. 2 along
with a new argument 〈A, a〉 = 〈{(a –≺x), (x –≺ z)}, a〉. The defeat relations are: B1,
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B2 and B5 defeat A; B3 defeats B2; B4 defeats B3; and B6 defeats B5.
The non-warranting tree TP5(A) is depicted on the right. For sim-
plicity, those arguments that can be built from P5 but do not appear
in the tree TP5(A) are assumed to be defeated by the corresponding
arguments that do appear. For instance, we assume arguments A and
B3 to be preferred over argument 〈{∼a –≺y,y –≺x,x –≺p},∼a〉, which
in consequence is not a defeater of A nor B3.
4 About Argumentation Lines and Marking
Dialectical trees are composed by argumentation lines. In particular we are inter-
ested in distinguishing those lines that determine the defeat of the root argument,
which we call attacking lines. In (Rotstein et al. 2009), a characterization of the
marking criteria has introduced the possibility of abstracting away from any specific
marking. In that article, different specific marking criteria have been also studied,
allowing the full characterization of argumentation lines, and specially attacking
lines have been defined on top of their marking sequence. There, the specific case
of the DeLP marking criterion, and the morphology of the DeLP attacking lines,
were analyzed in detail.
Definition 8 (Marking Sequence) Given a de.l.p. P, and an argumentation
line λ = [B1, . . . ,Bn] belonging to the marked dialectical tree TP(B1); the marking
function m : LinesP ×TreesP −→ {U,D}n determines a sequence m(λ, TP (B1)) =
[m1, . . . ,mn] such that each mi is the mark of the corresponding argument Bi ac-
cording to TP(B1).
Observe that the marking of a line is not considered individually, but in concor-
dance with the context provided by the tree it belongs to. For instance, in Ex. 5
the line [A,B5,B6] does not have the marking sequence [U,D,U ] but the sequence
[D,D,U ], since B1 (from line [A,B1]) is an undefeated defeater for A, which is thus
defeated (marked as D). Observe that the marking sequence of a line can be simply
a U (never a single D), or begin with a U or a D and then include an arbitrarily
long alternation of Ds and Us, and even at some point it could repeat any number
of Ds (never a U). Finally, any marking sequence always ends with a U .
Proposition 4 Given a de.l.p. P, and a dialectical tree TP(B1) ∈ TreesP , the
following conditions are met:
1. No argumentation line has a repetition of Us in its marking sequence. That is,
there is no λ ∈ TP(B1) such that m(λ, TP (B1)) = [. . . , U, U, . . .].
2. Argumentation lines may repeat Ds in their marking sequence. That is, it may
be the case that there is λ ∈ TP(B1) such that m(λ, TP (B1)) = [. . . , D,D, . . .].
3. The marking sequence of every argumentation line ends in a U . That is, for
every λ ∈ TP(B1) it holds m(λ, TP (B1)) = [. . . , U ].
4. In the marking sequence of every argumentation line, a U is followed by a D
unless the U stands for the leaf argument. That is, for every λ ∈ TP(B1) if
m(λ, TP (B1)) = [. . . , U,m, . . .] then m = D.
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Proof: The corresponding proof for each item follows straightforwardly from the
definition of the marking criterion given in Sect. 3.2. That is the case of items 3)
and 4). For 1) and 2), the following sketches may clarify this assertion.
1) From the adopted marking criterion, an inner node B is marked U iff every
child of B is marked D. This condition makes impossible to have a mark U for both
a node and some of its children.
2) From the adopted marking criterion, an inner node B is marked D iff there is
at least one child marked U . However, other children of B may be marked as D,
thus determining marking sequences with repetitions of Ds. 
From the proposition above, argumentation lines may be classified through reg-
ular expressions, which typify the lines according to their marking sequence. De-
pending on the dialectical tree being warranting or not, we will distinguish two
main different sorts of regular expressions.
Definition 9 (Warranting and Non-warranting Lines) Given a de.l.p. P and
the tree TP (A) ∈ TreesP ; for any λ ∈ TP (A), if the marking sequence m(λ, TP (A))
conforms to the regular expression U(D+U)∗ (resp., (D+U)+) then line λ is re-
ferred to as warranting (resp., non-warranting).
Proposition 5 Given the de.l.p. P and TP(A) ∈ TreesP ; for any λ ∈ TP(A), λ is
warranting (according to m(λ, TP (A))) iff TP(A) is warranting.
Proof: To prove that those regular expressions corresponding to warranting/non-
warranting lines are obtained from the DeLP marking criterion, we should obtain a
finite automaton equivalent to the regular expression at issue. From such automaton
a regular grammar can be defined. Afterwards, by induction, this grammar has to be
shown to conform a given regular language which should be proved to be obtained
from the marking criterion specified on page 11, Sect. 3.2. The complete formal
proof was left out from this article due to space reasons.
The proof for λ ∈ TP(A) being a warranting line iff TP(A) is warranting follows
straightforwardly from the definition of warranting trees on page 11 and Def. 9. 
Two different sorts of regular expressions were given in the proposition above
depending on whether the dialectical tree upon consideration is warranting or not.
In addition, we can go further in each case, and analyze particular configurations
to isolate the relevant situations for the specification of this model of change. Re-
garding a warranting tree, we will make no distinction among its argumentation
lines, since the objective of the change method we propose is to achieve warrant,
and in such a tree there is nothing to be done. On the other hand, when we con-
sider a non-warranting tree, as said before, we are interested in the characterization
of those lines that are somehow responsible for the root argument to be defeated,
i.e., attacking lines. The following proposition distinguishes the two different types
of non-warranting lines according to their marking sequence: those that have at least
one repetition of D, which we call D-rep lines, and those having a perfect alterna-
tion of Ds and Us, which we call alternating lines. Moreover, this characterization
will be shown to be complete afterwards in Prop. 6.
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Definition 10 (D-rep and Alternating Lines) Given a de.l.p. P and a non-
warranting tree TP(A) ∈ TreesP ; for any λ ∈ TP(A), if the marking sequence
m(λ, TP(A)) conforms to the regular expression (DU)∗(D+(DU)+)+ (resp., (DU)+)
then line λ is referred to as D-rep (resp., alternating).
Definition 11 (D-rep Sequence) Given a de.l.p. P and a non-warranting tree
TP(A) ∈ TreesP ; for any D-rep line λ ∈ TP (A) where λ = [A, . . . ,B1, . . . ,Bk, . . .],
any subsequence B1, . . . ,Bk of arguments whose marking is a consecutive subse-
quence of D nodes in m(λ, TP (A)) is referred to as D-rep sequence if it holds that
either B1’s parent in λ is marked as U or B1 = A and that Bk’s defeater in λ is
marked as U . Argument B1 is referred to as the head of the D-rep sequence. The
D-rep sequence in λ which is closer to the root argument A is referred to as the
uppermost D-rep sequence.
Proposition 6 Given a de.l.p. P, and the non-warranting tree TP (A) ∈ TreesP ;
for any λ ∈ TP(A), m(λ, TP (A)) conforms either to a D-rep or an alternating line.
Proof: The proof showing that the regular expressions corresponding to D-rep/
alternating lines are obtained from the DeLP marking criterion, follows similarly
to the proof given for Prop. 5.
On the other hand, for the proof showing that this characterization of non-
warranting lines is complete, we will asssume a non-warranting dialectical tree
rooted in an argument A, thus we have that A is marked as D. From Prop. 4.3,
leaves are marked as U , hence, A has at least one child. Any child of an argument
marked as D is (*) either marked (1) U , or (2) D. In the latter case, the node is
not a leaf (see Prop. 4.3), and the line would be a D-rep. Regarding (1), if it is
the case of a leaf, then we have an alternating line, whereas if it is an inner node,
the only option for its child is to be marked as D (see Prop. 4 items 1 and 4). In
this case, its child might be marked as either U , or D. By recursively following this
construction from (*), we have only alternating lines or D-rep lines. 
In order to finally identify attacking lines, it is necessary to study the relation
between these two sorts of non-warranting lines. D-rep and alternating lines are
interrelated in Lemma 1, as shown below. But firstly, let us introduce the notion
of adjacency among lines to provide appropriate theoretic terminology. Two (or
more) argumentation lines are referred to as adjacent if they share a common upper
segment containing one or more arguments. Finally, we refer as adjacency point to
the last argument in the common upper segment of two (or more) adjacent lines.
Definition 12 (Adjacency) Given a de.l.p. P, two acceptable argumentation lines
λ1 ∈ LinesP and λ2 ∈ LinesP are said to be adjacent at B iff λ
↑
1(B1) = λ
↑
2(B2) =
[A, . . . ,B]; where B1 ∈ λ1, B2 ∈ λ2, and B1 6= B2. Argument B is said to be the
adjacency point between λ1 and λ2.
Example 6 Consider the dialectical tree depicted on the right. Argumentation lines
λ1 and λ2 are adjacent at argument B1 since both upper segments λ
↑
1(B2) and λ
↑
2(B4)
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are equal [A,B1]. Argument B1 is the adjacency point between λ1 and
λ2. Regarding Ex. 5, the three Lines in the tree are adjacent at the root
argument A. From Ex. 4, four lines appear: λ1 = [A,B1,B2], λ2 =
[A,B1,B3], λ3 = [A,B1,B5], and λ4 = [A,B4,B5,B1,B3]. Note that
line λ4 is adjacent to lines λ1, λ2, and λ3, at the root argument A.
However, lines λ1, λ2, and λ3, are pairwise adjacent at argument B1.
Lemma 1 Every D-rep line has an adjacent alternating line whose adjacency point
is the head of its uppermost D-rep sequence.
Proof: Consider a de.l.p. P, a non-warranting tree TP(A) ∈ TreesP , and a D-rep
line λ = [A, . . . ,B1,B2, . . . ,Bk−1,Bk, . . .]. For the marking sequence m(λ, TP (A)),
let us assume, without loss of generality, that for every 1 ≤ i < k, arguments
Bi are marked as D, Bk as U , and from the root argument A down to B1 (both
marked as D), we have a perfect alternation of Ds and Us (see Prop. 6). In the
rest of the proof, we will refer to the sequences of Ds such as B1, . . . ,Bk−1 as a
D-rep sequence (see Def. 11). In a D-rep sequence, the last D argument (Bk−1) is
defeated because it has a child (Bk) that is undefeated. On the other hand, for its
parent (Bk−2) the situation is different: since Bk−2 is also marked as D the only
option we have for Bk−2 is to be the adjacency point with another line λ′ ∈ TP (A)
such that λ↑(Bk−1) = λ′↑(B
′) and the mark of B′ ∈ λ′ is U . Hence, since B′ is a
child of Bk−2 in TP(A), the adjacency point Bk−2 ends up marked as D.
The same reasoning follows for each one of the Bi arguments (1 ≤ i < k), i.e., for
each argument in the D-rep sequence. In particular, when considering the uppermost
D in the uppermost D-rep sequence (i.e., B1) since its child B2 is marked as D,
we necessarily have an adjacent line λ′′ ∈ TP (A) turning the adjacency point B1 to
D. There is an argument B′′ ∈ λ′′ marked as U which is a child of B1 in TP(A).
Note that the marking sequence of λ′′ in its upper segment λ′′↑[B′′] has a perfect
alternation of Ds and Us.
Below B′′, λ′′’s marking sequence may contain a D-rep sequence, but in that
case λ′′ would be a D-rep and by following the same reasoning we necessarily have
adjacent lines with adjacency points in each one of the Ds of λ′′’s D-rep sequence.
Since dialectical trees have a finite number of argumentation lines, this process
necessarily ends with a line that is not D-rep. Thus, from Def. 10 and Prop. 6,
an alternating line λn ∈ TP(A) appears, adjacent to λ′′ below B
′′ with adjacency
point at the first D of the D-rep sequence. But note that λn is also adjacent to λ
at B1. Hence, for every D-rep line there is an adjacent line with adjacency point D
(the first D corresponding to the head of the uppermost D-rep sequence) that is an
alternating line. 
Observe that reversing the Lemma 1 does not hold since, for instance, an even-
length single-line tree has one alternating line and no D-rep.
Lemma 2 The adjacency point between an alternating and a D-rep line is a pro
argument.
16 Moguillansky, Rotstein, Falappa, Garc´ıa and Simari
Proof: From Lemma 1 we know the adjacency point between an alternating and a
D-rep line is the head of the D-rep sequence. This means that the adjacency point
is marked as D. Afterwards, it is easy to see that the adjacency point is a pro
argument given that according to Def. 10, only pro arguments are marked as D in
the alternating lines. 
Theorem 1 Given the dialectical tree TP (A) ∈ TreesP , TP(A) is warranting iff
there is no alternating line λ ∈ TP(A).
Proof: ⇒) According to Prop. 5, a warranting tree has no alternating line, which
is a kind of non-warranting line (see Def. 9 and Def. 10). On the other hand, if the
tree is non-warranting, only two different kinds of line may appear (see Prop. 6):
alternating and D-rep. If we have some alternating line then we are done. On the
other hand, if we assume to have some D-rep, according to Lemma 1, we necessarily
have an alternating line to which the D-rep is adjacent.
⇐) Assuming we have no alternating lines, the root argument is marked either as
D or U . For the latter case, it is clear that the tree is warranting. For the former,
the tree is non-warranting. Thus, from Def. 10 and Prop. 6, if no alternating lines
exist, only D-rep lines could appear. However, this is not possible, from Lemma 1.
Hence, we reach an absurdity by assuming possible to have a non-warranting tree
without alternating lines. On the other hand, if we have at least one alternating
line, then the root argument is marked as D, and the tree is non-warranting. 
From Theorem 1, we can finally ensure that alternating lines are the ones threat-
ening the warrant status of dialectical trees. Thus, from now on, alternating lines
will be referred to as attacking lines.
Definition 13 (Attacking Line) Given a de.l.p. P and an argumentation line
λ in TP(A) ∈ TreesP , for any argument A ∈ ArgsP ; λ is an attacking line in
TP(A) iff m(λ, TP (A)) corresponds to an alternating line.
Corollary 1 Given the dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ TreesP , TP(A) is warranting iff
there is no attacking line λ ∈ TP(A).
Example 7 Consider the dialectical tree in Ex. 5 with lines λ1 = [A,B1], λ2 =
[A,B2,B3,B4], and λ3 = [A,B5,B6]. Two attacking lines appear: λ1 and λ2. Note
that the tree containing only line λ3 warrants A, since its marking sequence would
be [U,D,U ]. However, by considering trees with either λ1 or λ2 (or both), none
would end up warranting.
Clearly, this definition for an attacking line is totally dependent on the marking
criterion adopted. An intuitive notion of attacking lines may be given through a
minimal set Λ ⊆ X of argumentation lines in a dialectical tree (built with lines from
X) such that a new dialectical tree built with lines from X \Λ ends up warranting.
However, when analyzing the warrant status of a tree, we necessarily need to apply
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the marking procedure, and thus the recognition of attacking lines would again
depend on their marking sequences.
Note that the specific definition of attacking lines in DeLP is quite natural: an
argumentation line is attacking if its pro (resp., con) arguments are defeated (resp.,
undefeated). Recall that pro (resp., con) arguments are in favor (resp., against)
of the main issue being disputed: the root argument. Thus, such a line provides
a reasoning chain which is entirely against the root argument, and therefore, it is
sensible to consider the dialectical tree to be non-warranting.
We pursue a theory that recognizes the changes to be applied to a de.l.p. P in
order to turn a non-warranting tree TP(A) into warranting. The study of argumen-
tation lines along with their marking sequences, and the notion of attacking lines,
aids the definition of our argumentative model of change. These models handle the
dynamics of argumentative knowledge through the variation of the set of available
arguments. In ATC, dynamics in the argumentation theory is handled through the
alteration of some argumentation lines. Alterations could be carried out in a va-
riety of ways: a kind of alteration of a line λ is the removal (deactivation) of an
argument from λ, whereas a more complex choice is to add (activate) a defeater to
some argument in λ. In this article, we assume only the former alternative.
The main intuition behind the deactivating method for argument revision is to
alter each attacking line by deactivating an argument in it. When this alteration
turns the line to non-attacking, we refer to it as an effective alteration. As was
shown in Corollary 1, a dialectical tree free of attacking lines is a warranting tree.
Hence, after the revision, no argumentation lines will threaten the warrant of the
root argument since no attacking lines will be left unaltered.
Definition 14 (Line Alteration) Given a de.l.p. P, a set Γ ⊆ P, and a line
λ ∈ ALinesP ; the removal P \Γ provokes the alteration of λ on B iff there is some
Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that Γ′ ⊆ B, with B ∈ λ, and for every C ∈ λ↑(B), it holds Γ ∩ C = ∅.
The definition for a line alteration individualizes the argument B that will dis-
appear once rules in Γ are removed. This argument is such that no other argument
in B’s upper segment disappears. Hence, the proper upper segment of B would be
the resulting argumentation line from such an alteration. The following example
illustrates the notion of line alteration presented in Def. 14.
Example 8
Let us assume that the dialectical tree TP (A) ∈ ATreesP , depicted on the right
in fig. (a), is built from a given de.l.p. P. If we consider the de.l.p. P ′ resulting
from the removal P \ Γ, for some non-empty Γ ⊆ B3; we obtain the dialectical tree
18 Moguillansky, Rotstein, Falappa, Garc´ıa and Simari
TP′(A) ∈ ATreesP′ depicted in fig. (b). It is important to
note that the removal P \ Γ provokes the alteration of line
λ1 yielding the altered line λ
↑
1(B3) = [A,B1,B2] which is
exhaustive in P ′ but not in P.
As a different example, if we consider P ′ = P \ Γ,
where Γ ⊆ B2; the resulting dialectical tree will only con-
tain a single argumentation line: λ2. This is so, given that
λ↑1(B2) = [A,B1] is not exhaustive in P
′ since it is an upper (b)(a)
segment of λ2, i.e., λ
↑
1(B2) = λ
↑
2(B4).
Given a de.l.p. P and a line λ ∈ ALinesP , if Γ = ∅, then according to Def. 14, λ
might be considered altered on any of its arguments from P \ Γ. Observe however
that λ does not modify its configuration. Let us see the particular case, according
to Def. 14, with more detail: if Γ = ∅ then P \Γ (i.e., P) provokes the alteration of
λ on B iff there is some Γ′ ⊆ Γ (i.e., Γ′ = ∅) such that Γ′ ⊆ B, with B ∈ λ, and for
every C ∈ λ↑(B), it holds Γ∩C = ∅ (given that Γ = ∅). This kind of line alterations
(in which Γ = ∅) will be allowed just for theoretical matters, and will be referred
to as null line alterations.
Recall that the objective of altering lines is to turn (potential) attacking lines
into non-attacking. When this happens, the alteration is referred to as effective.
However, further considerations have to be taken into account for an alteration to
be considered effective.
Definition 15 (Effective Alteration) Given two de.l.p.s P and P ′, and two
lines λ ∈ ALinesP and λ′ ∈ ALinesP′ such that λ
′ is the line alteration of λ on an
argument B; λ is effectively altered on B iff λ′ = λ↑(B) and if λ′ ∈ TP′(A), with
TP′(A) ∈ ATreesP′ , then λ
′ is not attacking in TP′(A).
This definition takes a line alteration λ′ and provides the necessary conditions
for it to be effective. Checking that λ′ is not an attacking line in the resulting
de.l.p. depends on λ′ being an argumentation line in said program. This ensures
that λ′ is exhaustive, i.e., that it is not totally included in another argumentation
line. Whenever this happens, however, an alteration can still be effective, and ATC
would take care of the argumentation line including λ′.
An interesting question remains: given an attacking line, which is the right po-
sition in it to perform an effective alteration? Observe that every attacking line
ends with a con argument. This implies that an argumentation line ending with
a pro argument could never be an attacking line. However, not every line ending
with a con argument is an attacking line. Finally, the removal of a con argument
in an attacking line turns it into non-attacking, and the removal of a pro argument
in such a line yields an upper segment that is an attacking line. That is, the only
way to effectively alter an attacking line is by the removal of a con argument; re-
moving a pro would potentially augment the threat to the root. These intuitions
are formalized through the following propositions. Finally, Lemma 3 shows that
any alteration necessarily needs to be applied over a con argument in order to be
effective.
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Proposition 7 If λ is an attacking line in TP(A) ∈ TreesP then λ has even length.
Proof: By reductio ad absurdum, if we assume an attacking line λ to be of odd
length, its leaf argument is a pro argument. From Prop. 4.3, we know that the leaf
is marked as U . From Def. 13, we know that an attacking line has its pro arguments
marked as D. This means that λ is not attacking, contrary to the hypothesis. 
Corollary 2 A line ending with a pro argument can never be an attacking line.
For the following corollary, observe that the upper segment of a con argument in
any line renders a line whose leaf is a pro argument. Thus, according to Corollary 2
it cannot be attacking.
Corollary 3 The upper segment of a con argument in any line is a non-attacking
line. That is, for any λ ∈ TP(A) and any B ∈ λ−, the upper segment λ↑(B) is
non-attacking.
Proposition 8 The upper segment of a pro argument in an attacking line is also
an attacking line. That is, if λ ∈ TP(A) is attacking then for any B ∈ λ+, the upper
segment λ↑(B) keeps being attacking.
Proof: Line λ being attacking means that its marking sequence corresponds to
the regular expression (DU)+ (see Def. 10 and Prop. 6). When cutting the line on
a pro argument, the resulting upper segment λ↑(B) still conforms to the regular
expression (DU)+, since removing a D placed below a U does not change the latter
U mark. (Note that since λ↑(B) ends in a con argument, from Prop. 4.3, the leaf is
marked as U .) Hence, λ↑(B) keeps being attacking. 
Lemma 3 Given a non-warranting tree TP(A) ∈ TreesP , a line λ ∈ TP (A), and
an argument B ∈ λ; if λ is altered on B and B ∈ λ− then λ is effectively altered.
Proof: Assuming λ is altered on B and B ∈ λ−, we have to prove that λ is effectively
altered on B. From Def. 14, we know that λ↑(B) is the resulting altered line, and
since we know that B is a con argument in λ, we also know that λ↑(B) cannot be
attacking (see Corollary 3). Finally, since the conditions on Def. 15 are fulfilled, we
know λ is effectively altered on B. 
Proposition 9 Given a non-warranting tree, if there is a D-rep line λ, then either
λ’s length is odd or there is some D-rep λ′ such that λ′ is adjacent to λ and λ′’s
length is odd.
Proof: Since λ is a D-rep we know it is adjacent to an attacking line λa (see
Lemma. 1). We also know λ has some D-rep sequence (repeated sequence of D
nodes) (see Def. 10 and Def. 11). Observe that the first D from such a sequence
is the adjacency point, say B, between λ and λa (see Def. 12 and Lemma. 1).
Since λa is attacking we know that this node (B) corresponds to a pro argument
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(see Def. 13). Therefore, we know that the second D in the D-rep sequence in λ
corresponds to a con argument, say C, and since the leaf of a line is always marked
as U (see Prop. 4.3) we necessarily have that C is not λ’s leaf.
Afterwards, we know there is an extra argument defeating C which is pro. If such
an argument is λ’s leaf, then we have that λ ends in a pro argument and therefore
it is easy to see that λ’s length is odd.
On the other hand, if it is not λ’s leaf, we necessarily have that either λ eventually
ends in a pro argument, being odd its length in such a case; or that there is some
other adjacent D-rep λ′ whose adjacency point is C and λ′’s length is odd. This is
so, given that we know there is some U node defeating C (given that C is marked
as D), and since such a node corresponds to a pro argument, λ′ is necessarily an
odd-length D-rep line. 
Proposition 10 The upper segment of a pro argument in a D-rep line is an at-
tacking line if there is no other odd-length D-rep line adjacent to it. That is, if
λ ∈ TP(A) is a D-rep line then for any B ∈ λ+, the upper segment λ↑(B) is an
attacking line if it holds that for any λ′ ∈ TP(A), if λ
′ is adjacent to λ↑[B] then λ′
is not an odd-length D-rep.
Proof: Given a D-rep line λ ∈ TP(A) and some B ∈ λ+, we will assume there is no
other odd-length D-rep λ′ ∈ TP(A), such that λ′ is adjacent to λ↑[B]. By reductio
ad absurdum, we will assume that altering λ over the pro argument B ends in a
non-attacking uppersegment λ↑(B).
Let us assume argument C to be the adjacency point between λ and the adjacent
attacking line, say λa (in accordance to Lemma 1). From Lemma 2 we know C is a
pro argument, i.e., C ∈ λ+ and C ∈ λ+a . The following alternatives arise:
1) If B = C or B ∈ λ↑(C) then the alteration affects not only to λ but also to λa
(since in such a case, it holds B ∈ λa). Afterwards, since B is a pro argument and
B ∈ λa, from Prop. 8 we know that λ↑(B) ends up being attacking, reaching the
absurdity.
2) On the other hand, if C ∈ λ↑(B) then the alteration affects only to λ (since
B /∈ λa). Afterwards, since C is defeated in the adjacent attacking line λa by an
undefeated argument, the alteration of λ over B will not change λa’s attacking
status. This means that the dialectical tree will keep being non-warranting, and
therefore, the alteration of λ will render an uppersegment which will be either D-
rep or attacking. For the former case, we will assume λ↑(B) as D-rep. By hypothesis,
we also know that there is no odd-length D-rep adjacent to λ↑[B], and afterwards,
from Prop. 9 we know λ↑(B) necessarily ends being of odd length. Finally, we reach
the absurdity given that B is a pro argument and therefore, we know that λ↑(B)’s
length is even.
Hence, the only option for λ↑(B) is to be attacking. 
The need to avoid alterating lines over pro arguments is highlighted through the
following remark, which appears from the results shown by Prop. 10 and Prop. 8.
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Remark 2 The alteration of a non-warranting line over a pro argument can render
an attacking upper segment.
It is clear that any effective alteration of an attacking line needs to be performed
over a con argument in it. However, not necessarily every attacking line in a tree
has to be altered in order to obtain a tree free of attacking lines. This situation is
illustrated next and formalized afterwards by Lemma 4.
Example 9
Consider the non-warranting tree depicted below in fig. (a). The three argumen-
tation lines λ1, λ2, and λ3 are attacking. Note that λ1 and λ2 are adjacent at B1
which is marked as U , and the same situation occurs regarding λ1 and λ3. However,
λ2 and λ3 are adjacent at B4 which is
placed below B1. To warrant the root
argument, we need to alter every at-
tacking line from the tree. Nonetheless,
two different alternatives arise, either
to alter both λ2 and λ3 and turning in
consequence λ1 to non-attacking (see
fig. (b) on the right), or to alter only
λ1 which ends up turning both λ2 and λ3 to non-attacking (see fig. (c)). Note that
in both cases the resulting dialectical trees end up as warranting.
This example shows a particular configuration in which we can reduce the number
of attacking lines to be altered: attacking lines that are adjacent at an argument
marked as U . This requirement comes from the following analysis: if the adjacency
point is marked as U , the next argument in each of the (attacking) lines is necessarily
marked as D, and an effective alteration on any of these lines would turn it into a
U argument, consequently changing the marking of the adjacency point.
Lemma 4 Given TP(A) ∈ TreesP and two attacking lines λ1 ∈ TP (A) and λ2 ∈
TP(A) adjacent at an argument B marked as U . Effectively altering λ1 and every
attacking line adjacent to it at any argument below B, turns λ2 to non-attacking.
Proof: For the particular case in which B is λ1’s leaf this proof results trivial since
λ1 = λ2. Consequently, let us assume λ1 = [A, . . . ,B, C, . . .]. Since λ1 is attacking
and B is marked as U , we know C is marked as D. To achieve the effective alteration
of λ1 and that of every attacking line adjacent to it at any argument below B, two
options arise: either changes are done (1) below C or (2) above C. Note that C should
not be deactivated (removed) since it is a pro argument and an effective alteration
is only ensured when applied over a con argument (see Lemma 3), and moreover,
since λ1 is attacking, from Prop. 8 we know that altering it over C will result in a
still-attacking uppersegment. For (2) it is clear that not only λ1 results effectively
altered but also λ2 since both share the common upper segment [A, . . . ,B]. On the
other hand, for (1), the effective alteration of λ1 and every attacking line adjacent
to it at any argument below B provokes C to be marked as U . This turns B’s mark
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to D independently from the existence of λ2. Hence, λ2 results unaltered in form
but its marking sequence turns to D-rep, i.e., non-attacking. 
Now we know that for certain sets of attacking lines, just some of them have
to be altered in order to render every line in the set into non-attacking. Consider
a situation similar to the one expressed through Lemma 4, but with λ1 and λ2
adjacent at an argument B marked as D. In this case, the effective alteration of
λ1 (along with the attacking lines adjacent to it below B) would not turn λ2 to
non-attacking, since B’s mark D can only turn to U by changing the mark of all of
its children to D. Hence, λ2 would need to be altered as well.
Consequently, we should identify a subset of attacking lines, named attacking
set, in a tree such that altering only the lines it contains (no more, no less) would
yield a tree free of attacking lines. For instance, in order to turn to warranting the
dialectical tree depicted in figure (a) from Ex. 9, two possible subsets of attacking
lines appear: X1 = {λ1} and X2 = {λ2, λ3}. Ideally, we would prefer the attacking
set of smallest cardinality. However, this restriction is left as a minimal change
criterion. That is, it is not ensured that altering only λ1 instead of both λ2 and
λ3, provokes less change in the de.l.p. Thus, to introduce the formal definition
of attacking set, we will rely upon an alteration criterion identified as ≺[TP(A)]
to recognize among the subsets of lines from SP(A) –the bundle set determining
TP(A) (see Def. 6)– that set whose effective alteration of every line contained in
it would provoke as less change as possible in P with the objective to turn TP (A)
into warranting.
Definition 16 (Alteration Criterion) Given a de.l.p. P and an argument A ∈
ArgsP , the alteration criterion ≺[TP(A)] ⊆ (LinesP ×LinesP) over the dialectical
tree TP (A) ∈ TreesP , is the set of pairs (X1, X2) stating that the effective alteration
of every line in X1 ⊆ SP(A) is assumed to provoke less change than the effective
alteration of every line in X2 ⊆ SP (A). The infix notation X1≺[TP(A)]X2 will be
used to refer to (X1, X2) ∈ ≺[TP(A)].
Note that the alteration criterion defined above can be concretized by pursuing
minimality according to set cardinality, such that for any pair of sets X1 and X2 of
attacking lines from TP (A), X1≺[TP(A)]X2 holds iff |X1| < |X2| holds. Nevertheless,
we keep this criterion abstract in order to render a theory without unnecessary
restrictions. This decision benefits the pursuit of a model of change that allows to
guarantee different sorts of minimal change3. The notion of attacking set relying
upon the alteration criterion, as is formalized next in Def. 17, favors this objective by
choosing minimal sets of lines to be altered from a dialectical tree (see Theorem 3)
in order to render an altered dialectical tree which ends up warranting its root
argument (see Theorem 2).
Definition 17 (Attacking Set) Given a de.l.p. P, and the dialectical tree TP(A) ∈
TreesP ; the attacking set Att(TP(A)) is the set of lines satisfying:
3 Different perspectives on minimal change will be discussed later, in Section 6.
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1. Att(TP (A)) ⊆ {λ ∈ TP(A) | λ is an attacking line in TP(A)};
2. there is no pair of lines λ and λ′ in Att(TP (A)) such that λ is adjacent to
λ′ at an argument marked as U ;
3. there is no set X satisfying (1) and (2) such that Att(TP(A)) ( X or
X≺[TP(A)]Att(TP(A)).
The recognition of the attacking set Att(TP(A)) from a given dialectical tree
TP(A) involves the verification of three conditions: firstly, Att(TP (A)) is a subset
of the set of attacking lines from TP (A); secondly, as stated in Lemma 4, if several
adjacent attacking lines with adjacency point Uappear, to provoke the effective
alteration of every one of them it is sufficient to alter only one of them; for the
twofolded third condition we have that, the attacking set is maximal in the sense
that every line included in it must be effectively altered in order to render a war-
ranting tree (see also Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) and minimal in the sense that
no attacking line excluded from it needs to be explicitly altered (since it will be
effectively altered as a result of the alteration of the lines in Att(TP (A))) (see also
Theorem 2). Finally, the attacking set will be that which provokes as less change
as possible according to the alteration criterion ≺[TP(A)] (see Def. 16).
Clearly, the empty attacking set implies a warrating dialectical tree.
Proposition 11 If Att(TP (A)) = ∅ then TP (A) is warranting.
Proof: Straightforward from Def. 17 and Corollary 1. 
Theorem 2 Given the non-warranting tree TP(A) ∈ TreesP built from a set X ⊆
LinesP of argumentation lines in the context of a de.l.p. P; the dialectical tree re-
sulting from the effective alteration of every line in Att(TP (A)) ends up warranting.
Proof: Let us assume the existence of a de.l.p. P ′ ⊆ P which is obtained from P
by effectively altering every line λ ∈ Att(TP (A)) according to Def. 15. From Corol-
lary 1, we know that any dialectical tree free of attacking lines is warranting. From
Def. 17, we know Att(TP (A)) contains all the attacking lines in TP (A) excepting
the ones that have some attacking line within Att(TP (A)) adjacent at an argument
marked as U . Hence, we need to show that every attacking line λ′ ∈ TP(A) such
that λ′ 6∈ Att(TP (A)) is not an attacking line in TP ′(A) ∈ TreesP′ , which follows
from Lemma 4. 
Theorem 3 Given the non-warranting tree TP (A) ∈ TreesP built from a subset of
LinesP of argumentation lines in the context of a de.l.p. P; the dialectical tree re-
sulting from the effective alteration of every line in any proper subset of Att(TP (A))
ends up non-warranting.
Proof: From Def. 17, every line in Att(TP(A)) is attacking, hence if a line λ ∈
Att(TP(A)) is left unaltered, the resulting dialectical tree will contain an attacking
line, and from Corollary 1, it will be non-warranting. 
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5 Argument Theory Change
We apply to DeLP the deactivating revision operator (Rotstein et al. 2008), that is
part of ATC. In the dynamic abstract argumentation framework (Rotstein et al. 2010)
only active arguments are considered by the argumentative reasoner. Thus by de-
activation of an argument we refer to the reasoner no longer considering that ar-
gument. In its abstract form, the ATC argument revision operator revises an argu-
mentation theory by an argument seeking for its warrant. In this article, we propose
a concrete approach, from the abstract logic for arguments in past papers to the
logics used for de.l.p.s. These programs constitute the KBs from where the argu-
mentation framework is built. The deactivating ATC approach reified to DeLP was
preliminary introduced in (Moguillansky et al. 2008) and is extended here.
For specifying the ATC argument revision upon DeLP, we firstly describe how
to expand a de.l.p. by an argument A, to afterwards modify it (if necessary) by
analyzing the dialectical tree rooted in A, aiming at warranting A. To this end, we
follow the abstract deactivating approach to ATC which identifies the arguments to
be deactivated from the tree. Deactivation of arguments in DeLP involves removal
of rules from the worked de.l.p. Conversely, the modification of the program aims
at altering the tree, turning it to warranting. Doing this provokes change, not
only regarding the de.l.p. and the dialectical tree rooted in A, but also regarding
the set of warrants: some arguments could now be warranted, while some others
could consequently lose such condition. Alternatives to control change according to
different standpoints will be discussed in Section 6.
Besides removing rules (arguments deactivation), alteration of trees could be per-
formed through addition of rules (argument activation), in order to generate new
arguments to be incorporated to the tree, in order to turn it to warranting. This
approach, referred to as activating, falls beyond the scope of this article and was
treated in the context of an abstract argumentation framework in (Moguillansky et al. 2010).
Its reification to concrete logics like DeLP’s is part of future work.
The main idea towards the alteration of the tree is to effectively alter each (attack-
ing) line from the attacking set. This will be done through two main mechanisms:
a selection function which maps the appropriate argument to be deactivated from
each line, and an incision function which maps the appropriate defeasible rules
inside the argument to be deleted from the de.l.p. To decide which con argument is
selected in a given line, we will assume a selection criterion through which the set
of con arguments –from each argumentation line– could be ordered. A similar sit-
uation occurs among the defeasible rules inside arguments which will be addressed
through a rule-based criterion.
Deactivating a con argument from an attacking line λ ∈ TP (A) always ends
up yielding a non-attacking upper segment (see Corollary 3) and thus, the line
ends up effectively altered (see Lemma 3). However a major drawback appears:
since deactivating an argument B means the deletion of some defeasible rules from
the de.l.p., other arguments containing some of these rules would also disappear.
Particularly, a line λ′ ∈ TP(A) containing some of those disappearing arguments
will be collaterally altered. This is referred to as a collateral incision provoked by
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the original incision over B. Observe that a collaterally incised non-attacking line
might be turned to attacking. Hence, the revision process should consider to alter
not only attacking lines, but also other lines that may turn to attacking from a
collateral incision. The alteration set is identified as the set of every line in TP (A)
to be altered by the revision process. Note that this new set would contain the
attacking lines contained in the attacking set, while possibly adding more lines.
The general outline of the revision process is given in Schema 1.
Schema 1 The Revision Process
Input: A de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) and an argument A
Output: A revised de.l.p. P ∗ A
1: Expand the program P by A to obtain the program P ′ = (Π,∆ ∪A)
2: Obtain the dialectical tree TP ′(A) ∈ TreesP′
3: Define a selection function γ : LinesP′ → ArgsP′ mapping each λ ∈ TP′(A)
to the con argument B ∈ λ− whose deactivation would provoke less change
according to a selection criterion “≺λ”.
4: Define an incision function σ : ArgsP′ → 2
Ld to map the selected argument
γ(λ) from each line λ to some defeasible rules inside γ(λ) according to a rule-
based ordering criterion “≺”.
5: Define the alteration set Λ containing every line from the attacking set
Att(TP′(A)) along with those lines from TP′(A) that would be turned into
attacking by a collateral incision.
6: P ∗ A = (Π,∆′), where ∆′ = (∆ ∪ A) \
⋃
λ∈Λ σ(γ(λ))
Regarding minimal change, it is natural to look for changing a program by delet-
ing as few rules as possible from it. However, each defeasible rule that is deleted
has a direct impact in the resulting dialectical tree analyzed to give warrant to the
new argument. Consequently, we can identify three different axes of change:
1. how to decide among the con arguments in each line to be altered, which will
be controlled by the selection criterion;
2. how to decide among the defeasible rules inside each selected argument to be
deactivated, that will be controlled through the rule-based criterion;
3. how to deal with the problem of collateral incisions.
We will study in detail the first and third axes of change, whereas the second
axis is abstracted away by assuming it to be given in advance. Regarding the latter
axis, an unanswered question is left to be addressed throughout this section: is it
necessarily mandatory to avoid collateral incisions, or is it possible to take advantage
of a collateral incision to alter several lines at once? Moreover, for cases in which
the latter question is true, how such pursuit would affect the first two axes? The
reader should keep in mind that the need to manage different criteria of change is
related to the inherently complex nature of the problem; furthermore, each criteria
is meant to interact with the others in order to achieve an appropriate solution.
Note that this solution would involve a compromise, since the main challenge in
this model of change is to achieve a balance among the three axes of change. In
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consequence, sometimes it will be necessary to update some of the initial orderings
towards this balance. This discussion will be attended later in this section.
5.1 Basic Elements of the Change Machinery
The argument revision operation will be performed over a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) by
a new argument 〈A, α〉. This argument will end up being warranted from the pro-
gram resulting from the revision. However, 〈A, α〉 is required to constitute a proper
argument structure after the addition of A to P . Thus, A∪Π should have a defea-
sible derivation for α. Since the set Π of strict rules and facts represents (in a way)
the current state of the world (which is indisputable), it is clear that A does not
stand by itself, but in conjunction with Π. Argument 〈A, α〉 could be brought up,
for instance, by an agent sensing the environment. In such a case, 〈A, α〉 is going to
be called P-external, since it may contain defeasible rules external to the program
P. However, if we consider the external information in A along with the set ∆ of
defeasible rules in P, then A should be an argument compliant with Def. 1.
Definition 18 (External Argument Structure) Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p.,
〈A, α〉 is a P-external argument structure (or simply, external argument)
for a literal α from P iff A 6⊆ ∆ and 〈A, α〉 is an argument structure from (Π,∆∪A).
The domain of P-external arguments is identified through the set XargsP .
Once the external argument 〈A, α〉 is added, the dialectical tree rooted in it has
to be built in order to check its warrant status. The change machinery alters this
tree only whenever it does not warrant 〈A, α〉. Therefore, such tree rooted in A is
referred to as temporary dialectical tree, since it will (in general) be an intermediate
state during the revision process.
Although it would be interesting to provoke 〈A, α〉 to end up warranted only
when α is not already warranted from another argument, it is desirable to always
achieve warrant for 〈A, α〉 in order to support the new external information brought
by it. Therefore, since warrant for α could be easily checked beforehand, the stress
is put on the complications arising of ensuring A to end up undefeated.
Given the temporary dialectical tree, for every line λ in it, a con argument is se-
lected over λ− on behalf of the selection criterion “≺λ”, by means of an argument
selection function γ. This criterion codifies one of the axes of change, setting an
ordering among the con arguments in a given line. Afterwards, we present an ex-
ample illustrating a reasonable initial setting of the set “≺λ”. Later in this section
it will be clear why the proposed ordering is just “initial”, and not definitive.
Definition 19 (Selection Criterion (Set)) Given a de.l.p. P and the dialectical
tree TP(A) ∈ TreesP , for any line λ ∈ TP(A), the selection criterion ≺λ ⊆
(ArgsP×ArgsP) is the set of pairs (B1,B2) stating that the deactivation of B1 ∈ λ−
is assumed to provoke less change than that of B2 ∈ λ−. The infix notation B1≺λB2
will be used to refer to (B1,B2) ∈ ≺λ.
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Example 10 Assuming the root argument A as the main issue being disputed, it
is natural to think that the lower we go in an argumentation line in the tree, the
most we move away from the main issue. Therefore, when looking for an argument
in a line to be incised, the lowest the argument we deactivate is, the least change we
provoke to the program in relation to the main issue in dispute. This intuition is
used to initialize the selection criterion (different postures are discussed in Sect. 6):
Initial setting: Given a line λ ∈ SP(A) where SP(A) determines TP (A),
≺λ = {(B1,B2) | B1 ∈ λ−,B2 ∈ λ−, and B2 ∈ λ↑(B1)}
The selection criterion will allow us to univocally determine which argument is
the right one to be deactivated in order to effectively alter any argumentation line.
Recall that the choice of selecting just con arguments comes from Lemma 3. In
addition, we assume the existence of a special kind of argument, referred to as
escape argument and noted as ǫ, such that ǫ ∈ ArgsP for any de.l.p. P. The escape
argument is used for theoretical matters only. Finally, no argument from ArgsP
defeats ǫ and ǫ does not defeat any argument from ArgsP .
Definition 20 (Argument Selection Function “γ”) Given a de.l.p. P, the ar-
gument selection function γ : LinesP → ArgsP is defined as:
γ(λ) =
{
ǫ if λ− = ∅
B ∈ λ− otherwise
such that if ≺λ 6= ∅ then there is some C ∈ λ
− where (B, C) ∈ ≺λ and for any other
C′ ∈ λ− such that (C′,B) ∈ ≺λ it holds (B, C
′) ∈ ≺λ.
After an argument was selected for incision, a decision should be made according
to which portion of the argument is going to be cut off. Since arguments are formed
by defeasible rules, we provide a mechanism to set a preference over sets of defeasi-
ble rules: the rule-based criterion. This criterion addresses the second axis of change
stated before. Rules in de.l.p.s can be ordered in a wide variety of ways, e.g., dy-
namically through a lexicographic ordering method. This discussion exceeds the
scope of the article. Although incisions are going to rely on the rule-based criterion,
we will abstract away from it and will assume an order is given beforehand.
Definition 21 (Rule-Based Criterion) Given a de.l.p. (Π,∆), the rule-based
criterion ≺ ⊆ 2L
d
× 2L
d
defines a total order between pairs of subsets of ∆.
Definition 22 (Argument Incision Function “σ”) Given a de.l.p. P, a func-
tion σ : ArgsP → 2L
d
is an argument incision function such that:
σ(B) =
{
∅ if B = ǫ
Γ otherwise
where ∅ ⊂ Γ ⊆ B such that Γ≺Γ′ holds for any Γ′ ⊆ B, where Γ 6= Γ′.
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An argument incision function σ is applied to the selected argument, identifying
a non-empty subset of defeasible rules to be cut off from the de.l.p. Once the incision
over a con argument is performed, the line it belonged to ends up effectively altered.
Lemma 5 Given a de.l.p. P and TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , if “σ” is an incision function
then for any λ ∈ TP(A), P \ σ(γ(λ)) determines an effective alteration of λ.
Proof: Considering γ(λ), from Def. 20, two options arise: either λ− = ∅, in which
case γ(λ) = ǫ, or otherwise we know γ(λ) ∈ λ−. Considering σ(γ(λ)), from Def. 22,
again we have two options: either (1) γ(λ) = ǫ, in which case σ(γ(λ)) = ∅, or
otherwise, (2) σ(γ(λ)) = Γ, where Γ ⊆ γ(λ). For (1), P \ σ(γ(λ)) = P determines
a null alteration of λ (see Def. 14). However, since λ− = ∅, we know λ contains
only the root argument which means that λ has odd length, and from Prop. 7
(contrapositive), we know λ is not attacking. Hence, the alteration of λ is effective
(see Def. 15). On the other hand, for (2), P \ σ(γ(λ)) alters λ rendering a non-
attacking upper segment λ↑(B) of λ. Hence, λ is altered by deactivating one of its
con arguments. From Lemma 3, we know this ends up in an effective alteration of
λ which means that it turns to non-attacking (independently of λ being previously
attacking). Finally, P \ σ(γ(λ)) determines an effective alteration of λ (Def. 15). 
To deactivate an argument, we need to delete defeasible rules from the de.l.p. at
issue. These rules are mapped by the incision function applied over that argument.
Moreover, the incised defeasible rules are considered to provoke the least possible
change in concordance with the minimal change principle. Regretfully, sometimes
incisions will affect more arguments than the one being incised. In order to identify
this situation, we introduce the notion of collateral incision.
Definition 23 (Collateral Incision) Given a de.l.p. P, an incision over an ar-
gument D provokes a collateral incision over an argument B iff σ(D) ∩ B 6= ∅.
For any λ ∈ LinesP , if B ∈ λ and σ(D)∩C = ∅ for every C ∈ λ↑(B), we say σ(D)(B)
is the uppermost collateral incision over λ where σ(D)(B) = σ(D) ∩ B.
When a collateral incision occurs over more than one argument in the same
line, we will be interested in the uppermost collaterally incised argument, since its
deactivation will make the arguments below it in the line to disappear from the
resulting tree. Hence, non-uppermost collateral incisions will not be affecting the
status of the root argument in the temporary tree.
From now on, we will make reference only to uppermost collateral incisions
(though sometimes we will omit the word “uppermost”) through the notation in-
troduced in the above definition. Collateral incisions represent the main difficulty
to overcome: the involuntary deactivation of pro arguments in non-attacking lines
might turn them into attacking lines. In the case of the pro argument belonging to
an attacking line, as analyzed before, its deactivation would not change the line’s
status (see Prop. 8). Moreover, although a collaterally incised con argument does
not turn lines into attacking, it would also be a source of possibly unnecessary
change. Therefore, it is desirable to select arguments in which there is a possibility
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of incision that never results in a collateral incision to other arguments. This is
captured by the cautiousness principle.
(Cautiousness) γ(λ) \
⋃
{B in TP(A) | B 6= γ(λ)} 6= ∅, for every λ ∈ TP(A)
Definition 24 (Cautious Selections) A selection function γ is identified as cau-
tious iff it satisfies cautiousness.
A cautious selection function γ ensures that there is some incision function σ such
that for any λ ∈ TP(A), it follows σ(γ(λ)) does not collaterally incise any other
argument B in the tree; namely σ(γ(λ))(B) = ∅. Nonetheless, it is important to
remark that the possibility for an incision function to cut rules avoiding collateral
incisions will be highly dependent on the rule-based criterion. That is, an incision
may apply for the best option given by the criterion, but this might not be the
best one to avoid a collateral incision. In such cases, a possible alternative is to
relax the order given by the rule-based criterion. This matter speaks about the
relation between the second and third axes of change. The appropriate analysis of
this subject is similar to the selection criterion’s which motivates the inclusion of
an update rule. This will be made clear later in this section.
Example 11 From the tree of Ex. 5, the only possible selection in the attacking line
[A,B1] is B1, whereas for the attacking line [A,B2,B3,B4], the selection function
could return either B2 or B4, depending on the selection criterion. Regarding the
selection of B4, it satisfies cautiousness because it has no intersection with any other
argument. In contrast, the selection of B2 would be non-cautious, since its two rules
∼a –≺y and y –≺p belong to B1 and B3, respectively. Finally, considering B1 in
the other attacking line, we have that B1 ∩ A = {x –≺z} and B1 ∩ B2 = {∼a –≺y}.
However, the remaining portion of B1 is non-empty: B1\
⋃
{A,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6} =
{y –≺x}; hence, the selection of B1 satisfies cautiousness.
Sometimes cautiousness may not be satisfied. In such a case, when a non-cautious
selection is unavoidable, the incision inevitably provokes collateral incisions. Some-
times collateral incisions could be harmful: assume a line λ is collaterally incised
over B ∈ λ, thus provoking the involuntary deactivation of B. If B is placed above
the selection in that line, i.e., B ∈ λ↑(γ(λ)), then the regular (non-collateral) alter-
ation of λ –performed through the deactivation of γ(λ)– is left without effect. That
is, the effective alteration of λ, leaving a non-attacking line λ′, cannot be completely
trusted since collateral incisions might turn λ′ to attacking afterwards.
These situations need to be appropriately addressed to ensure the correctness
of the revision operation. Hence, an additional condition should be provided in
order to preserve every effective alteration from being collaterally altered. Next
we introduce the preservation principle, which avoids collateral incisions over any
line to occur over arguments placed above the selected argument in that line. In
addition, preservation also ensures no collateral incision to occur over the root
argument. This is necessary to keep A active which is paramount to pursue its
warrant. It is important to note that the preservation principle is given as a logical
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formula to restrict the respective images of the selection and incision functions. Note
that this principle does not intend to provide any specific procedure nor algorithm.
(Preservation) If σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then B 6= A and γ(λ) ∈ λ↑[B],
for every λ ∈ TP (A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and B ∈ λ
This principle is illustrated in the figure depicted on
the right and exemplified in Ex. 12. When an incision in
line λ′ (the left branch in the figure) results in an up-
permost collateral incision σ(γ(λ′))(B) over an argument
B in line λ (right branch), it must be ensured that the
selection γ(λ) in line λ is performed on the upper seg-
ment of B. Finally, note that if B is the root node A
then the consequent of the preservation principle is false
(B = A), which forces the antecedent to be false in or-
der for the principle to hold. Hence, preservation requires
σ(γ(λ′))(A) = ∅ to be satisfied. We refer to this individual
condition as root preservation.
(Root preservation) σ(γ(λ))(A) = ∅, for every λ ∈ TP(A)
Example 12 Let us consider the dialectical tree on the right, upon which selections
and incisions are applied. Assuming the selections γ(λ1) = B5 and γ(λ2) = B6,
and that the incision over B5 provokes a collateral incision over B4,
i.e., σ(γ(λ1))
(B4) 6= ∅, we have that, in order for preservation to hold,
the selection over λ2 should be placed on or above B4, i.e., γ(λ2) ∈
λ↑2[B4]. The alternative would be to find a different selection function
mapping to B2 from λ2, and thus the alteration of λ2 would finally result
from the incision over B2. Note that, if the old selection were kept, the
collateral incision over B4 would have yielded the attacking line [A,B2].
When preservation is satisfied given that every collateral incision σ(γ(λ′))(B)
occurs solely over the selection B = γ(λ′) (and therefore λ = λ′), the principle
holds for each line in the dialectical tree, since γ(λ) ∈ λ↑[B] is always satisfied. We
refer to this particular case as strict preservation.
(Strict preservation) If σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then λ = λ′ and γ(λ) = B,
for every λ ∈ TP (A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and B ∈ λ
An incision function satisfying strict preservation ensures no argument is collat-
erally incised by any incision in the tree excepting for the incision over the selected
argument itself. However, this principle is too restrictive and thus, it may sometimes
be impossible to satisfy. Observe that there exists a relation between cautiousness
and strict preservation: a selection function satisfying cautiousness ensures there
exists some incision function free of collateral incisions, while an incision function
satisfying strict preservation ensures that, with the actual configuration of inci-
sions, no collateral incisions over an argument different from the selected one will
occur. The following two propositions address such relation between cautiousness
and strict preservation.
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Proposition 12 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A), and a selection func-
tion “γ”, if cautiousness is satisfied then there is some rule-based criterion which
leads to a strict-preserving incision function “σ”.
Proof: If γ is cautious, then for any line λ ∈ TP (A) there exists a set of rules
Xλ ⊆ γ(λ) that does not overlap with any other argument in TP (A), i.e., Xλ∩B = ∅,
for every λ ∈ TP(A), every B ∈ λ′ and every λ′ ∈ TP(A), such that γ(λ) 6= B. Let
us assume a rule-based criterion such that for any Γ ⊆
⋃
λ∈TP(A)
Xλ and any
Γ′ ⊆ ∆ satisfying Γ ∩ Γ′ = ∅, it holds Γ≺Γ′. Such rule-based criterion leads to
an incision function satisfying σ(γ(λ)) ⊆ Xλ, and then the deactivation of each
selected argument γ(λ), would not provoke any other argument to be deactivated.
That is, σ(γ(λ))(B) = ∅, for every λ ∈ TP (A) and any B 6= γ(λ). Observe that this
condition leads to the verification of strict preservation. Therefore, there exists a
rule-based criterion leading to a strict-preserving incision function. 
Proposition 13 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP (A), a selection function
“γ”, and an incision function “σ”, if strict preservation is satisfied then cautious-
ness is also satisfied.
Proof: If σ is strict-preserving then no incision provokes collateralities. That is, if
σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then λ = λ′ and γ(λ) = B, for every λ ∈ TP(A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and
B ∈ λ. Thus, σ(γ(λ′))(B) = ∅ holds always that B 6= γ(λ) is ensured. This means
that, in each λ, there is a subset of γ(λ) that does not belong to any argument
B 6= γ(λ) in TP (A). Therefore, γ is cautious. 
Proposition 12 states that, when a selection is cautious, even though it overlaps
with some argument, the incision over that selection might be performed outside
this overlapping. In this case, there is no collateral incision and strict preservation
holds. Finally, by Proposition 13, it is clear that a strict-preserving incision function
may be achieved only through cautious selections.
The three preservation principles are interrelated through the following proposi-
tion. Afterwards, given a dialectical tree, it is shown the utmost importance of the
preservation principle regarding the controlled alteration of lines and any arising
collateralities towards achieving a warranting condition for the root argument.
Proposition 14 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and an
argument incision function “σ”,
1. if preservation is satisfied then root preservation is also satisfied.
2. if strict preservation is satisfied then preservation is also satisfied.
Proof: 1. Assume preservation is satisfied and consider B = A, if σ(γ(λ′))(A) 6= ∅
then we know A 6= A, which is absurd. Hence, σ(γ(λ′))(A) = ∅, and therefore,
root-preservation holds.
2. Assuming strict preservation is satisfied, we know that if σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then
λ = λ′ and γ(λ) = B, for every λ ∈ TP(A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and B ∈ λ. In particular
this means that B 6= A, given that from Def. 20, a selection is necessarily a con
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argument, and thus it cannot be the root argument which is pro. Besides, since
γ(λ) = B it also holds γ(λ) ∈ λ↑[B]. Finally, preservation is satisfied. 
Definition 25 (Warranting Incision Function) An argument incision function
“σ” is said to be warranting iff it satisfies preservation.
The fact that an incision function satisfies the preservation principle ensures that
it will handle collateral incisions in a proper manner. Then, any arising attacking
line will be correspondingly effectively altered. For the following definition recall
that SP (A) refers to the bundle set of argumentation lines in the dialectical tree
rooted in A from the de.l.p. P (see Def. 6).
Lemma 6 Given a de.l.p. P and a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , if “σ” is
a warranting incision function then for any set X ⊆ SP(A), P \
⋃
λ∈X σ(γ(λ))
determines the effective alteration of each λ ∈ X.
Proof: If |X | = 1, let X = {λ} be effectively altered from P \
⋃
λ∈X σ(γ(λ)) (see
Lemma 5). We need to show that this property also holds when |X | > 1. Suppose
now X also contains a line λ′ ∈ X and assume its effective alteration provokes
a collateral alteration over argument B ∈ λ. By reductio ad absurdum, assume
the effective alteration of λ is affected by the collateral alteration provoked by λ′,
this means that the upper segment λ↑(γ(λ)) turns to attacking from the collateral
incision over B. This implies that γ(λ) /∈ λ↑[B]. However, since σ is known to be
warranted, from Def. 25, it satisfies preservation, hence since σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅, we
know that γ(λ) ∈ λ↑[B], which is absurd. Afterwards, no line λ′ ∈ X affects the
effective alteration of any λ ∈ X . Observe that this also holds for any X ⊆ SP(A).
Finally, P \
⋃
λ∈X σ(γ(λ)) determines the effective alteration of each λ ∈ X . 
Sometimes, the ordering among con arguments established by the selection crite-
rion could make the incision function fail to be warranting. That is, since incisions
are determined by selections, the only solution to this issue is for the selection cri-
terion to propose another candidate. This involves an update of the initial order.
Such update will provoke the selections to reassign some of the original mappings.
Thereafter, the incisions over the new mappings will also be reassigned, and finally
preservation would be satisfied, thus obtaining a warranting incision. For instance,
in order to guarantee preservation, in Ex. 12 it is suggested the selection over λ2
to be reassigned from B6 to B2. Since Def. 20 determines the mapping γ(λ2) to the
“best” argument (i.e., B6) according to the selection criterion, the alternative to
provoke the selection to determine a different mapping (i.e., B2) is to update (or
change) the ordering among con arguments.
Note that the selection order is being re-accommodated to the detriment of the
first axis of change but favoring the other two, bringing balance among the three
axes. This is quite natural since the initial order is just a general posture but
the updated order would finally suit the particular domain in which the line is
immersed: the dialectical tree. The set determined by the selection criterion is
updated through:
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(Update rule) For every λ ∈ TP(A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and B ∈ λ where preservation
does not hold for σ(γ(λ′))(B), then the new selection order is
≺λ \ {(B1,B2) ∈ ≺λ | B1 /∈ λ↑[B] or B2 /∈ λ↑[B]}.
Observe that the update rule forces a set ≺λ to be replaced by ≺λ↑[B]. This will
prevent an argument placed below B to be mapped by the selection function γ(λ),
and therefore, preservation will now be satisfied for the case σ(γ(λ′))(B), which
failed beforehand.
Theorem 4 There is always a selection criterion leading to a warranting incision.
Proof: To this end, it is sufficient to show one selection criterion that always
allows for a warranting incision function: the selection of the root’s direct defeaters.
Hence, given a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) and a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , for
every λ ∈ TP(A), it follows γ(λ) defeats A, thus λ = [A, γ(λ), . . .]. By reductio ad
absurdum, let us assume that such selection criterion does not lead to a warranting
incision function. This means that at least one incision is not compliant with the
preservation principle, i.e., an incision of a selected argument over λ′ ∈ TP (A)
triggers a collateral incision over an argument B ∈ λ where λ ∈ TP (A), namely
σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅, in a way that (a) γ(λ) /∈ λ↑[B], and/or (b) B = A.
For a), the only option we have is A = B, hence case a) is resolved in b). After-
wards, for b), we would necessarily have a collateral incision over the root argument.
Thus, for some λ′ ∈ TP(A), it follows σ(γ(λ′))(A) 6= ∅. Note that there cannot be
an argument C in TP(A) such that C ⊆ A and C is a direct defeater for A. For
this to take place, A ∪ C ∪ Π = A ∪ Π would have to be contradictory. Therefore,
for any λ ∈ TP(A), it is never the case that γ(λ) ⊆ A, and thus there is some
set Xλ ⊆ γ(λ) that could be incised without provoking a collateral incision over
A, i.e., Xλ ∩ A = ∅. Besides, since we want to warrant A, it is natural to assume
that any rule-based criterion should preserve A from being incised, and therefore,
for any Γ′ ⊆ (∆ \ A) and any Γ ⊆ A, it holds Γ′≺Γ. Hence, for any λ ∈ TP(A),
σ(γ(λ)) ⊆ Xλ and therefore σ(γ(λ))(A) = ∅ hold, which is absurd.
Finally, it is absurd to assume that selecting the root’s direct defeaters does not
lead to an incision function satisfying preservation, and therefore by effect of the
update rule, there is always a selection criterion leading to a warranting incision. 
The alteration of every line in a dialectical tree through a given warranting inci-
sion function, renders a warranting tree as is shown next.
Theorem 5 Given a de.l.p. P and a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , for any
warranting incision function “σ”, A ends up warranted from P \
⋃
λ∈SP(A)
σ(γ(λ)).
Proof: Straightforward from Theorem 4, Lemma 6, Def. 15, and Corollary 1. 
Regarding the amount of change provoked to a de.l.p., following the theorem
above, no minimality is pursued so far. In the rest of the article we will provide
additional theoretical elements towards minimal change. To this end, we will study
how to bring balance among the three axes of change introduced on page 25.
34 Moguillansky, Rotstein, Falappa, Garc´ıa and Simari
As suggested before, when collateral incisions are unavoidable, we could still
take advantage of them. That is, a collateral incision could be “forced” to provoke
an attacking line to turn into non-attacking by collaterally incising its selected
argument. Such a side-effect would be profitable, and it is described by the following
principle. (Example 13 illustrates the verification of this principle.)
(Profitability) If σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then λ ∈ Att(TP (A)) and γ(λ) = B,
for every λ ∈ TP (A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and B ∈ λ
The profitability principle validates only those cases in which every collateral
incision occurs over an attacking line and coincides with the selection in that line.
Therefore, by updating the selection criterion (applying the update rule) towards
profitability verification, we have the chance to take advantage of collateral incisions
and to effectively alter several attacking lines at once, thus reducing the amount of
deleted rules in the de.l.p. However, this principle is not always possible to satisfy.
For such cases, a weak profitability principle is proposed.
(Weak Profitability) If σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then γ(λ) = B,
for every λ ∈ TP (A), λ′ ∈ TP(A), and B ∈ λ
Weak profitability skips checking whether the collaterally altered line is contained
by the attacking set or not. However, it still satisfies that the collaterally incised
argument is the selection in that line, i.e., satisfying this principle would still help
to reduce the deletion of rules from the de.l.p.
Example 13
Consider the tree TP(A) on the right, with three argumentation
lines: λ1 = [A,B1,B3,B5], λ2 = [A,B2,B4], and λ3 = [A,B6], of
which λ1 and λ3 are attacking lines. Assume the selections γ(λ1) =
B5, γ(λ2) = B2, and γ(λ3) = B6. The following table shows potential
configurations of incisions and collateral incisions, along with their
compliance with the principles of profitability and weak profitability:
Incision Coll. Inc. Profitability Weak Profitability
B5 B4 No, γ(λ2) 6= B4 and λ2 /∈ Att(TP (A)) No, γ(λ2) 6= B4
B5 B2 No, λ2 /∈ Att(TP (A)) Yes
B5 B6 Yes Yes
Proposition 15 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and an
argument incision function “σ”:
1. if profitability is satisfied then weak profitability is satisfied;
2. if weak profitability is satisfied then preservation is satisfied.
Proof: 1. Straightforward from profitability and weak-profitability.
2. For any λ ∈ TP(A) and any B ∈ λ, B = γ(λ) holds. Afterwards, B ∈ λ↑[B] and
A 6= B hold given that B ∈ λ− (see Def. 22). Finally, preservation is satisfied. 
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5.2 Alteration Set Recognition
Given TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , the warrant forAmay be obtained by effectively altering a
subsetX ⊆ SP(A) of its lines via incisions. This would render a (altered) warranting
tree. Collateral incisions may appear as the main drawback, hence the analysis will
require to identify hypothetical trees HP(A,Ψ): dialectical trees that would result
by removing the defeasible rules contained in a given set Ψ ⊆ P from the de.l.p. P.
Definition 26 (Hypothetical Tree) Given a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆), an argument
A ∈ ArgsP , the tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a set Ψ ⊆ ∆ of defeasible rules; the
hypothetical tree HP(A,Ψ) is the dialectical tree built from the set X1 ∪ X2 of
lines, where X1 and X2 are defined as follows:
X1 = {λ ∈ TP(A) | ∀B ∈ λ : Ψ ∩ B = ∅}
X2 = {λ↑(B) | λ ∈ TP(A) such that ∃B ∈ λ, ∀B
′ ∈ λ↑(B) :
Ψ ∩ B 6= ∅ and Ψ ∩ B′ = ∅}
Observe that hypothetical trees are built from sets of lines which may consider
non-exhaustive lines, and therefore, HP(A,Ψ) for any Ψ, is contained in the set
TreesP of (non-acceptable) dialectical trees from P .
Proposition 16 Given a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) and an argument A ∈ ArgsP , for any
set Ψ ⊆ ∆ of defeasible rules, it holds HP(A,Ψ) ∈ TreesP .
Proof: From Def. 26, a hypothetical tree HP (A,Ψ) is built by a set X1 ∪ X2 of
lines. If Ψ = ∅ it is easy to see that X1 = SP (A), where SP(A) is the bundle
set of the tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and X2 = ∅. Hence, HP(A,Ψ) = TP (A) and
therefore HP(A,Ψ) ∈ TreesP . The same situation occurs when Ψ is such that there
is no defeasible rule β ∈ Ψ such that β ∈ B, where B ∈ λ for any λ ∈ TP(A).
When any of these alternatives hold, we know X2 6= ∅ and therefore HP(A,Ψ) is
known to consider some non-exhaustive lines. This is so, given that X2 will contain
upper segments λ↑(B) of lines λ ∈ TP (A) for some B ∈ λ. Since TP(A) ∈ ATreesP ,
we know it is composed by acceptable and exhaustive lines from ALinesP . From
Remark 1, we have that λ ∈ LinesP , and from Proposition 2 and Def. 4, we have
that λ↑(B) ∈ LinesP for any B ∈ λ. Finally, HP (A,Ψ) ∈ TreesP holds for any Ψ. 
As being (informally) introduced before, the alteration set of a dialectical tree
TP(A), is a subset of lines from SP(A) such that their effective alteration will
determine a resulting warranting tree for A. Ideally, the attacking set Att(TP (A))
will be included within this set, however, other lines could arise to be altered: those
that may collaterally turn to attacking, introducing a new source of threat for
the root’s status of warrant. Based on the notion of hypothetical tree, collaterality
functions bring a tool for accounting on collateralities which are determined by the
effective alteration of lines. The formalization of alteration set (given in Def. 28)
will rely on the notion of collaterality functions introduced next.
Definition 27 (Collaterality Functions) Given a de.l.p. P, an argument A ∈
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ArgsP , and a warranting incision function “σ”. Functions ⊚[P,A] : ALinesP →
2ALinesP and ⊙[P,A] : ALinesP → 2
ALinesP , are referred to as collaterality func-
tions iff for any λ ∈ ALinesP , if λ /∈ TP(A) then both functions map to ∅, otherwise:
⊙[P,A](λ) = {λ
′ | λ′ ∈ TP (A), σ(γ(λ)) ∩ γ(λ
′) 6= ∅}
⊚[P,A](λ) = {λ
′ | λ′ ∈ TP (A), λ′↑(B) ∈ Att(HP (A, σ(γ(λ)))) for some B ∈ λ′}
We refer to ⊚[P,A] as open, and to ⊙[P,A] as closed.
The effective alteration of a line λ ∈ TP(A) renders three different types of
collateral alterations: those that turn effective the alteration of a line λ′ ∈ TP (A)
being collaterally incised over its selected argument –included in ⊙[P,A]–, those that
turn to attacking –included in ⊚[P,A]–, and those that are effective, but collaterally
incised over an argument placed below its selection. Collateral incisions over an
argument placed above the selection of a line cannot occur given that “σ” is ensured
to be warranting, thus satisfying preservation. We will refer to lines in⊚[P,A] as open
given that they represent a still open problem: they are attacking or may collaterally
turn to attacking. These lines need to be incised in order to be effectively altered.
On the other hand, we refer to lines in ⊙[P,A] as closed since they were already
(collaterally) effectively altered: they no longer threaten the root’s warrant status.
Example 14
Consider the dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP depicted below, on the right,
with an attacking set Att(TP (A)) = {λ1, λ2, λ3}. Let us assume the selection cri-
terion to determine the following mappings: γ(λ1) = B1, γ(λ2) = B2, γ(λ3) =
B3, γ(λ4) = B4, γ(λ5) = B5, γ(λ6) = B6, and γ(λ7) = B7. Let ϕ1, ϕ2,
ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, and ϕ6 be defeasible rules
in the de.l.p. P such that {ϕ1} ⊆ B1,
{ϕ1, ϕ2} ⊆ B2, {ϕ2, ϕ3} ⊆ B3, {ϕ2} ⊆ C4,
{ϕ4} ⊆ B4, {ϕ4} ⊆ C5, {ϕ3} ⊆ B5,
{ϕ2} ⊆ C6, {ϕ4, ϕ6} ⊆ B6, {ϕ6} ⊆ C7,
{ϕ5} ⊆ B7. Assume also the rule-based
criterion:
{ϕ6}≺{ϕ5}≺ {ϕ4}≺{ϕ3}≺{ϕ2}≺{ϕ1},
and the incision function mappings:
σ(γ(λ1)) = {ϕ1}, σ(γ(λ2)) = {ϕ2}, σ(γ(λ3)) = {ϕ3}, σ(γ(λ4)) = {ϕ4}, σ(γ(λ5)) =
{ϕ3}, σ(γ(λ6)) = {ϕ6}, and σ(γ(λ7)) = {ϕ5}.
Observe that “σ” is a warranting incision function since it satisfies preservation.
The collaterality functions are defined as follows:
⊚[P,A](λ1) = {} ⊙[P,A](λ1) = {λ1, λ2}
⊚[P,A](λ2) = {λ4, λ6} ⊙[P,A](λ2) = {λ2, λ3}
⊚[P,A](λ3) = {} ⊙[P,A](λ3) = {λ3, λ5}
⊚[P,A](λ4) = {λ5} ⊙[P,A](λ4) = {λ4, λ6}
⊚[P,A](λ5) = {} ⊙[P,A](λ5) = {λ3, λ5}
⊚[P,A](λ6) = {λ7} ⊙[P,A](λ6) = {λ6}
⊚[P,A](λ7) = {} ⊙[P,A](λ7) = {λ7}
The open set for λ1 is empty because the incision over the selection in λ1 does
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not “open” any line, i.e., it does not collaterally turn any line into attacking in the
context of the hypothetical tree HP (A, σ(γ(λ1))). The closed set for λ1 includes lines
λ1 and λ2, as the incision over the selection in λ1 “closes” both lines, i.e., turns
them into non-attacking. On the other hand, if we look at λ2, its open set is {λ4, λ6},
as the incision over the selection in λ2 is ϕ2 which collaterally incises C4 and C6,
thus turning both λ4 and λ6 into attacking. According to Def. 27, this turns out
from the analysis of the hypothetical tree HP(A, σ(γ(λ2))) = HP (A, {ϕ2}). That is,
since λ↑4(C4) ∈ Att(HP (A, {ϕ2})) and λ
↑
6(C6) ∈ Att(HP(A, {ϕ2})) hold, we obtain
⊚[P,A](λ2) = {λ4, λ6}. All collaterality functions are obtained in a similar way.
The following properties for open and closed sets interrelate the collaterality
functions presented in Def. 27.
Proposition 17 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a
warranting incision function “σ”, for any λ ∈ TP(A), it holds λ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ).
Proof: From Def. 27, the set ⊙[P,A](λ) contains every line λ
′ ∈ TP (A) whose
selected argument γ(λ′) contains at least a rule ϕ such that ϕ ∈ σ(γ(λ)). This
holds in particular when λ = λ′. 
Proposition 18 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a
warranting incision function “σ”, for any λ ∈ TP(A), it holds λ /∈ ⊚[P,A](λ).
Proof: By reductio ad absurdum, assuming λ ∈ ⊚[P,A](λ), from Def. 27, we have
λ↑(B) ∈ Att(HP (A, σ(γ(λ)))), for some B ∈ λ. However, since σ is warranting, we
know preservation is satisfied which means that any collateral incision in a line will
occur over some argument placed below the selected argument in that line (or over
the selection itself). In this proof we are interested in the case in which such a line is
λ itself (given that we assumed λ ∈ ⊚[P,A](λ)). Hence, for any B ∈ λ, if σ(γ(λ))
(B) 6=
∅ then γ(λ) ∈ λ↑[B] holds. Afterwards, since λ↑(B) ∈ Att(HP(A, σ(γ(λ)))), for some
B ∈ λ; we know that σ(γ(λ))(B) 6= ∅ and also γ(λ) ∈ λ↑[B] hold. Thus, the only
alternative is B = γ(λ) to be held (recall that the colateral incision over B is the
uppermost one in λ).
Finally, since λ is effectively altered through σ(γ(λ)) (see Lemma 6), we know
that λ↑(B) /∈ Att(HP (A, σ(γ(λ)))) holds reaching the absurdity. 
Corollary 4 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a warrant-
ing incision function “σ”, for any λ ∈ TP(A), it holds ⊚[P,A](λ) ∩ ⊙[P,A](λ) = ∅.
Now we are able to formalize the definition of alteration set by relying upon the
open collaterality function as mentioned before.
Definition 28 (Alteration Set) Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree
TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a warranting incision function “σ”; the alteration set
ΛP(A) of TP (A) is the least fixed point of the operator ℓP(A) defined as follows:
ℓP(A)
0
= Att(TP (A)), and
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ℓP(A)
k+1
= ℓP(A)
k ∪
⋃
λ∈ℓP (A)
k ⊚[P,A](λ)
Example 15 (Continues from Ex. 14) The alteration set ΛP(A) is constructed
as follows: ℓP(A)
0
= {λ1, λ2, λ3}, conciding with Att(TP (A)); ℓP(A)
1
= {λ1, λ2,
λ3, λ4, λ6}, given that both λ4 and λ6 are collaterally open (turned to attacking)
from the effective alteration of λ2, that is λ
↑
4(C4) and λ
↑
6(C6) are contained in
Att(HP(A, {ϕ2})); and analogously ℓP(A)
2
= {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6, λ7} is calcu-
lated. Observe that ℓP(A)
2
= ℓP(A)
3
and hence ℓP(A)
2
= ΛP(A), determining the
least fixed point of the operator ℓP(A). Finally, ΛP(A) = {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6, λ7}.
Remark 3 Given a de.l.p. P and a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , the following
conditions for an alteration set ΛP(A) with a warranting incision “σ”, are met:
1. Att(TP (A)) ⊆ ΛP(A), and
2.
⋃
λ∈ΛP (A)
⊚[P,A](λ) ⊆ ΛP(A).
From now on, just for simplicity, we will rely on the operator Σσ : 2
ALinesP → 2L
d
such that Σσ(X) =
⋃
λ∈X σ(γ(λ)) for any X ⊆ SP(A) and any A ∈ ArgsP , to refer
to the composition of selections and incisions over lines included in the set X .
Lemma 7 Given the alteration set ΛP(A) and a warranting incision function “σ”;
if Ψ = Σσ(ΛP(A)) then HP (A,Ψ) is warranting.
Proof: Since σ is a warranting incision function and considering the dialectical tree
TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , from Lemma 6, we know that P \ σ(γ(λ)) effectively alters any
λ ∈ TP(A). The set Ψ contains every incision σ(γ(λ)) for every λ ∈ ΛP(A). Then
the following properties arise:
1. for any λ ∈ TP(A) such that λ ∈ Att(TP (A)), λ ∈ ΛP(A), (this follows
from 1 in Remark 3)
2. for any λ ∈ TP(A) such that λ ∈ ΛP(A) and λ /∈ Att(TP (A)), λ is collater-
ally turned to attacking by an incision σ(γ(λ′)), of some λ′ ∈ ΛP(A), (this
follows from 2 in Remark 3 and from Def. 27)
3. for any λ ∈ TP(A) such that λ /∈ ΛP(A), if λ is attacking then λ /∈
Att(TP (A)). That is, there is λ
′ ∈ Att(TP (A)) such that λ and λ
′ are
adjacent at an argument marked as U (see Def. 17 and Def. 28), and
4. for any λ ∈ TP(A) such that λ /∈ ΛP(A), λ is not collaterally turned to
attacking (see Def. 28 and Def. 27).
Consequently, we have that ΛP(A) contains every line in Att(TP (A)) (property
1) along with every line that collaterally turns to attacking (property 2). Only from
property 3, a line λ can be attacking but not contained in ΛP(A). In this case, λ
will be (collaterally) effectively altered by the alteration of its adjacent line λ′ (see
Lemma 4). From property 4, we know that any other line outside ΛP(A) does not
threaten the warrant status of the root argument. Afterwards, it is easy to see that
HP(A,Ψ) contains no attacking lines. Finally, from Theorem 1, HP(A,Ψ) is known
to be a warranting tree. 
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By effectively altering every line in the alteration set, through Lemma 7 we ensure
that the resulting hypothetical tree HP(A,Ψ) ends up warranting. However, if we
consider minimal change to force the set Ψ of incisions to be minimal, an additional
condition is required to restrict the notion of alteration set given so far.
Example 16 (Continues from Ex. 15)
According to Lemma 7, the
hypothetical treeHP(A,Ψ) (left-
most tree depicted on the right),
where Ψ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4,
ϕ5, ϕ6}, ends up warranting
A. However, removing its sub-
set Ψ′ = {ϕ1, ϕ3} from P is
enough to alter every line in
Att(TP(A)), rendering the war-
ranting hypothetical tree HP(A,Ψ′) (rightmost tree depicted on the right).
Collaterality functions are not aware of the context in which incisions are applied.
That is, when a line λ′ is closed from ⊙[P,A](λ), we know it is effectively altered in
a collateral way through the incision of λ. That means that the collateral incision of
λ′ occurs over its selected argument, say B. However, imagine that the collaterality
occurs over a con argument C placed below B. In this case, although λ′ is not altered
over its selected argument, it should be anyway considered closed (see Ex. 17), if
it could be ensured that no other line will collaterally alter λ′ between B and C
(we know there is no collateral alteration over an argument placed above B given
that we only consider a warranting incision function). In order to ensure this latter
condition, we need keep track of all those lines that are going to be altered by
inlcuding them in a set X ⊆ SP(A), for which set X is identified as the context at
issue. In Ex. 17, we illustrate a case in which a line (λ3 in the example) could be
ensured to be closed without deactivating its selected argument, if the rest of the
lines to be altered are taken in consideration, i.e., if we consider the context.
Example 17 Consider the dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP depicted on the right,
with an attacking set Att(TP (A)) = {λ1, λ2}. Let us assume the selection criterion
to determine the following mappings: γ(λ1) = B1, γ(λ2) = B2, and γ(λ3) = B3.
Let ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 be defeasible rules in the de.l.p. P such that
{ϕ1} ⊆ B1, {ϕ2} ⊆ B2, {ϕ3} ⊆ B3, {ϕ2} ⊆ C4, and {ϕ1} ⊆ B4.
Assuming the rule-based criterion {ϕ3}≺{ϕ2}≺{ϕ1}, the incision
function would map as follows: σ(γ(λ1)) = {ϕ1}, σ(γ(λ2)) =
{ϕ2}, and σ(γ(λ3)) = {ϕ3}. Observe that “σ” is a warranting
incision function since it satisfies preservation. The collaterality
functions are defined as follows:
⊚[P,A](λ1) = {} ⊙[P,A](λ1) = {λ1}
⊚[P,A](λ2) = {λ3} ⊙[P,A](λ2) = {λ2}
⊚[P,A](λ3) = {} ⊙[P,A](λ3) = {λ3}
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Regarding open lines, when a line λ′ is included in ⊚[P,A](λ), we know it collat-
erally ends up being attacking from the incision over λ. However, attacking lines
are not considered open so far. Next we define the context-sensitive collaterality
functions over a context set X ⊆ SP(A) of lines. As for its general version, the
context-sensitive collaterality functions will include two inner functions: one for
open lines and another one for closed lines. The context-sensitive open version will
include the lines that are open from lines in the context X (following Def. 27), along
with lines in the attacking set. On the other hand, the context-sensitive closed ver-
sion will include every line being effectively altered as detailed before (in Ex. 17,
λ3’s collateral alteration from the alteration of λ1 should close λ3), but taking into
account the context. That is, lines which are closed by other lines contained in the
context set X , along with those lines λ′ that are closed by being collaterally altered
over a con argument B ∈ λ′− placed below the selected argument in λ′, if it is the
case that no other line in X collaterally alters λ′ over an argument placed above B.
Definition 29 (Context-sensitive Collaterality Functions) Given a de.l.p.
P, a tree TP (A) ∈ ATreesP , and a warranting incision “σ”. Functions ⊚̂[P,A] :
2ALinesP → 2ALinesP and ⊙̂[P,A] : 2
ALinesP → 2ALinesP , are referred to as context-
sensitive collaterality functions iff for any set of lines X ⊆ ALinesP , if X 6⊆
SP(A) (where SP(A) is the bundle set) then both functions map to ∅, otherwise:
⊙̂[P,A](X) = {λ
′ | λ′ ∈ TP(A) ∧ ∃C ∈ λ′− : (∃λ ∈ X : σ(γ(λ)) ∩ C 6= ∅) ∧
(∀λ′′ ∈ X : if σ(γ(λ′′))∩B 6= ∅ where B ∈ λ′ then C ∈ λ′↑[B])}
⊚̂[P,A](X) = Att(TP (A)) ∪
⋃
λ∈X ⊚[P,A](λ)
We call context-sensitive open to ⊚̂[P,A], and closed to ⊙̂[P,A].
Example 18 (Continues from Ex. 17) Note that if we consider a set of lines
X = {λ1, λ2} to be altered, the collaterality functions would determine ⊚[P,A](λ1)∪
⊚[P,A](λ2) = {λ3} and ⊙[P,A](λ1) ∪ ⊙[P,A](λ2) = {λ1, λ2}, meaning that λ3 is
left unaltered. However, by following the notion of context-sensitive collaterality
functions, we have ⊚̂[P,A](X) = {λ1, λ2, λ3}, and ⊙̂[P,A](X) = {λ1, λ2, λ3}.
Proposition 19 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a
warranting incision function “σ”; for any λ ∈ TP(A), and any X ⊆ SP (A) (where
SP(A) is the bundle set of TP(A)), if λ ∈ X then ⊙[P,A](λ) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](X).
Proof: Assuming λ ∈ X we need to show that for any λ′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ) it holds
that λ′ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](X). From Def. 27, we know that any λ
′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ) is such that
σ(γ(λ))∩γ(λ′) 6= ∅. Assume γ(λ′) = C. Observe that C ∈ λ′− (see Def. 20). Finally,
∀λ′′ ∈ X : if σ(γ(λ′′)) ∩ B 6= ∅ where B ∈ λ′ then C ∈ λ′↑[B], is trivially satisfied
given that σ is a warranting incision function and C is the selected argument in
λ′ (see preservation on page 30). Finally, since all the conditions in Def. 29 for a
context-sensitive closed function are satisfied, it holds λ′ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](X). 
Proposition 20 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a
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warranting incision function “σ”; for any X ⊆ SP (A) (where SP (A) is the bundle
set of TP(A)), it holds X ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](X).
Proof: Directly from Prop. 17 and Prop. 19. 
Note that, contrary to ⊙[P,A], the operation ⊙̂[P,A] is non-monotonic: given two
sets X and Y , of lines, if X ⊆ Y then ⊙̂[P,A](X) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](Y ) is in general not
satisfied. For space reasons we will not go further into this subject.
Lemma 8 Given a de.l.p. P, a dialectical tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , and a warranting
incision function “σ”; for any λ ∈ TP(A), and any X ⊆ SP(A) (where SP(A) is the
bundle set of TP(A)), if every λ′ ∈ X is altered through σ(γ(λ′)) and λ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](X)
then λ is effectively altered.
Proof: From Prop. 20, we know thatX ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](X). From Lemma 6, the alteration
of every λ′ ∈ X rendering a new de.l.p. P ′ = P \Σσ(X), effectively alters every λ′
conforming to Def. 15, i.e., every λ′ ∈ X turns to non-attacking in P ′. For the rest
of the lines in ⊙̂[P,A](X), from Def. 29, if λ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](X) then we know that there
is some λ′ ∈ X such that σ(γ(λ′)) ∩ C 6= ∅ where C ∈ λ−, and for any λ′′ ∈ X ,
if σ(γ(λ′′)) ∩ B 6= ∅ where B ∈ λ then C ∈ λ↑[B]. This means that there is no
line in X whose incision could collaterally alter λ in an argument placed above C.
Hence, C is the uppermost collateral incision over λ taking into account only the
lines included in X . Finally, from Lemma 3, since C is a con argument in λ, we
know λ is effectively altered on C. 
We finally restrict the definition of alteration set into the notion of incision-aware
alteration set to deal with situations as the ones described above. For this reduced
alteration set, we will rely upon context-sensitive collaterality functions. Afterwards
in Section 6, an algorithm will be studied for future implementations.
Definition 30 (Incision-aware Alteration Set) Given a dialectical tree TP (A)
and a warranting incision function “σ”, the incision-aware alteration set of
TP(A) is the set ΘP(A) simultaneously satisfying:
1. ΘP(A) ⊆ ΛP(A),
2. ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)),
3. there is no proper subset of ΘP(A) satisfying 1 and 2, and
4. for any X 6= ΘP(A) satisfying conditions 1 to 3, it is not the case that
Ψ′≺Ψ, where Ψ = Σσ(ΘP(A)) and Ψ′ = Σσ(X).
Following the four conditions of Def. 30, the incision-aware alteration set ΘP(A)
is (1) a subset of the alteration set ΛP(A) such that (2) every line that was open was
finally closed under the same context, which is ΘP(A) itself, and (3) is the minimal
set of lines –with regards to set inclusion– that (4) provokes the least amount of
change –according to the rule-based criterion ≺.
Corollary 5 Given the incision-aware alteration set ΘP(A) and a warranting in-
cision function “σ”; if every λ ∈ ΘP(A) is effectively altered through σ(γ(λ)) then
every line in ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) is effectively altered.
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Proposition 21 Att(TP (A)) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)).
Proof: From Def. 29, Att(TP (A)) ⊆ ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) and from condition 2 in Def. 30,
⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) holds. Thus, Att(TP (A)) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)). 
Theorem 6 Given the incision-aware alteration set ΘP(A) and a warranting in-
cision function “σ”; if Ψ = Σσ(ΘP(A)) then HP(A,Ψ) is warranting.
Proof: Since σ is a warranting incision function and considering the dialectical tree
TP(A) ∈ ATreesP , from Corollary 5, we know that the effective alteration of every
line in ΘP(A) determines the effective alteration of every line in ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)).
Since Att(TP(A)) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) (see Prop. 21) hold, we know that every line
in Att(TP(A)) is effectively altered. This means that no attacking lines appear in
HP(A,Ψ). Finally, from Corollary 1, the hypothetical tree HP (A,Ψ) is warranting.

While the regular alteration set looks for the “minimal” set of lines that has to be
altered (without accounting on the incisions needed), the incision-aware alteration
set pursues the same objective while looking for a minimum amount of incisions. For
instance, in Ex. 16, the incision-aware alteration set ends up as ΘP(A) = {λ1, λ3}.
Observe that the set {λ1, λ2, λ4, λ5} satisfies conditions 1 to 3 from Def. 30, but not
condition 4: the effective alteration of its lines determines a set of defeasible rules
{ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4} which naturally provokes more change (according to the rule-based
criterion) than the set {ϕ1, ϕ3} determined by the set ΘP(A).
However, being aware of the incisions to be made, determines a set of lines to
be altered that could actually end up being smaller than the one determined by
the regular alteration set. Such a situation ocurs, given that the incision-aware
alteration set considers contextual information, and thus, the alteration of some
lines included in the regular alteration set (and excluded from the incision-aware
one) are achieved by taking into account advantageous collateralities, i.e., those
collateral incisions that end up in effective alterations. Nevertheless, although the
incision-aware alteration set can be smaller, it ends up altering each of the lines
contained in the regular alteration set, either in a direct way –through the appli-
cation of the incision function in a line– or by effect of a collateral incision. For
instance, in Ex. 19, although the incision-aware alteration set (which ends up as
ΘP(A) = {λ1, λ2}) does not contain λ3 (which is contained in the regular alter-
ation set ΛP(A) = {λ1, λ2, λ3}), it ends up effectively altering λ3 by effect of the
collaterality produced by the incision of λ1 ∈ ΘP(A). Thus, the incision-aware al-
teration set ends up altering (directly or through collateralities) every line included
in the regular alteration set, however, the incision-aware alteration set does it by
removing (occasionally) less rules from the de.l.p.
Example 19 (Continues from Ex. 17) The alteration set would be ΛP(A) =
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{λ1, λ2, λ3} determining a warranting tree HP(A,Ψ)
(leftmost tree depicted on the right), where Ψ =
{ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3}. However, the incision-aware alteration
set would be ΘP(A) = {λ1, λ2} determining a war-
ranting tree HP(A,Ψ′) (rightmost tree depicted on
the right), where Ψ′ = {ϕ1, ϕ2}.
Assuming a warranting incision function “σ” whose image maps only to sets
of singletons, we can preserve a kind of minimality: any rule to be removed from
a de.l.p. is individually necessary to provide warrant to the root argument. This
assertion aims at avoiding unnecessary removals from a de.l.p., and is required by
the postulate of core-retainment, on page 48. Such a function is referred to as a
minimally-warranting incision function, and is defined next.
Definition 31 (Minimally-warranting Incision Function) An argument inci-
sion function “σ” is said to be minimally-warranting iff it is a warranting inci-
sion function and for all B ∈ ArgsP such that σ(B) 6= ∅ it holds |σ(B)| = 1.
Theorem 7 Given a de.l.p. P and a warranting incision function “σ”, if σ is
minimally-warranting then HP(A,Ψ \ {ϕ}) is non-warranting, for any ϕ ∈ Ψ,
where Ψ = Σσ(ΘP(A)).
Proof: From the hypothesis we know that, ϕ ∈ σ(γ(λ)), for some λ ∈ ΘP(A); and
since |σ(γ(λ))| = 1 (see Def. 31), it holds σ(γ(λ)) = {ϕ}. Since ΘP(A) is minimal
(see cond. 3 in Def. 30), it includes λ necessarily because it is the unique line which
through σ(γ(λ)) closes another line λ′ ∈ ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)). Thus, λ
′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ) and
hence, λ′ /∈ ⊙̂[P,A](X), where X = ΘP(A) \ {λ}. (If another line λ
′′ ∈ X were
closing λ′, this would determine λ′ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](X), and thus minimality of ΘP(A)
would be violated.) It is clear that λ′ ∈ ⊚̂[P,A](X), since λ closes λ
′, thus λ′ cannot
be simultaneously open by λ. Afterwards, ⊚̂[P,A](X) 6⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](X). This means that
λ′ has not been effectively altered in HP(A,Ψ \ {ϕ}). And thus, since it contains
an attacking line, HP(A,Ψ \ {ϕ}) is non-warranting. 
Corollary 6 Given a de.l.p. P and a warranting incision function “σ”, if σ is
minimally-warranting then HP(A,Ψ) is non-warranting, where Ψ = Σσ(X), for
any X ⊂ ΘP(A).
The theorem above ensures “some kind of” minimality regarding the set of rules
to be removed from a de.l.p. However, real minimality regarding removals from a
de.l.p. cannot be achieved without compromising the first axis of change (selection
criterion) as being described on page 25. Moreover, by concretizing the alteration
criterion ≺[TP(A)] (see Def. 16) considering that minimality is determined according
to set cardinality (see example given on page 22), the attacking set Att(TP (A))
ends up being the smallest possible set satisfying Def. 17, i.e., there is no set
X 6= Att(TP (A)) satisfying Def. 17 such that |X | < |Att(TP (A))|. By ensuring
such a concretization for the alteration criterion we still cannot ensure that there
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is no set Ψ′ ⊆ P such that HP (A,Ψ′) is warranting and |Ψ′| < |Ψ|, where Ψ =
Σσ(ΘP(A)). A set like Ψ′ can be obtained by deactivating only direct defeaters
of the root argument (this option will be discussed in Section 6), excluding any
possible selection criterion from consideration and thus compromising the first axis
of change. This is illustrated in Ex. 20. A fourth axis of change could take into
account the amount of rules to be removed from a de.l.p. Nonetheless, this decision
would complicate even more our theory. In this paper we abstracted away from such
consideration, and concentrated only on the analysis of the impact of change over
the original dialectical tree by proposing three axes of change as aforementioned.
Example 20 Consider the tree TP(A) ∈ ATreesP depicted on the right, where P
is a de.l.p. Let us assume a selection criterion such that B3≺λ1B1,
B4≺λ2B1, and B5≺λ3B1; and the support of arguments B1, B3,
B4, and B5 to be singletons where ϕ1 ∈ B1, ϕ3 ∈ B3, ϕ4 ∈ B4, and
ϕ5 ∈ B5. Clearly, ΘP(A) = {λ1, λ2, λ3}, and σ(λ1) = ϕ3, σ(λ2) =
ϕ4, and σ(λ3) = ϕ5. Hence, the hypothetical tree HP (A,Ψ), with
Ψ = {ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5}, is warranting. Note however that a model of
change disregarding not only the selection criterion, but the three
axes of change, could choose a set Ψ′ = {ϕ1} rendering a warranting hypothetical
tree HP(A,Ψ′), and moreover, satisfying |Ψ′| < |Ψ|. By taking into account Ψ′, the
resulting de.l.p. would only lose a single defeasible rule. Nonetheless, the resulting
dialectical tree would be smaller than the one resulting from our model of change.
This is important when considering dialectical trees as explanations for the status
of the root argument, as analyzed in (Garc´ıa et al. 2007).
5.3 Interrelating Attacking and Alteration Sets
In the rest of this section we will study the relation among the attacking set, and
the regular and incision-aware versions of the alteration set. In general, the stud-
ied properties pose restrictions upon the worked incision function such that, when
satisfied they ensure Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A) (Theorem 8, Corollary 7, and Theo-
rem 9), ΛP(A) = ΘP(A) (Theorem 10), or even Σσ(Att(TP (A))) = Σσ(ΛP(A)) =
Σσ(ΘP(A)) (Theorem 11). These properties are important in the development of
the optimized algorithms given in Section 6 for constructing the proposed argu-
mentative model of change.
We firstly state under which conditions the attacking set and the regular alter-
ation set, coincide. Theorem 8 shows that this happens when the lines in Att(TP (A))
only provoke collateral alterations (if any) over lines within Att(TP (A)). Since the
same condition is part of the requirements of the profitability principle, Corollary 7
follows afterwards. On the other hand, if every collaterality incises only selected ar-
guments from other lines, then no new lines will be open. This property fulfills the
requirements of an incision function satisfying weak profitability. Thus, Theorem 9,
shows Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A) holds if weak profitability is satisfied.
Theorem 8 Given a warranting incision function “σ”, for any λ′ ∈ Att(TP (A)),
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any λ ∈ TP(A), and any B ∈ λ; [if σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then λ ∈ Att(TP (A))] iff
Att(TP(A)) = ΛP(A).
Proof: ⇒) From Remark 3, we know that Att(TP(A)) ⊆ ΛP(A), hence we need
to show that ΛP(A) ⊆ Att(TP (A)). This is equivalent to show ℓP(A)
0 = ℓP(A)
1
from Def. 28, which is equivalent to show ⊚[P,A](λ
′) ⊆ Att(TP (A)), for any λ′ ∈
Att(TP(A)). Observe that this follows straightforwardly from the hypothesis. Hence,
Att(TP(A)) = ΛP(A) holds.
⇐) Analogously, assuming Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A) holds, implies ℓP(A)
0
= ℓP(A)
1
from Def. 28, and thus also ⊚[P,A](λ
′) ⊆ Att(TP (A)), for any λ′ ∈ Att(TP (A)).
This means that the effective alteration of any attacking line will not open a non-
attacking line, i.e., no non-attacking line is turned into attacking. Finally, it is easy
to see that the condition if σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then λ ∈ Att(TP(A)) holds. 
Corollary 7 If profitability is satisfied then Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A).
Theorem 9 If weak-profitability is satisfied then Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A).
Proof: Since weak-profitability holds, we have that, if σ(γ(λ′))(B) 6= ∅ then γ(λ) =
B, for every λ ∈ TP (A), λ′ ∈ TP (A), and B ∈ λ. This means that no collaterality
will open any line, i.e., for every λ′ ∈ TP(A), it follows ⊚[P,A](λ
′) = ∅ holds –
meaning that no collaterality will turn a non-attacking line into attacking. Hence,
it also holds ℓP(A)
0
= ℓP(A)
1
, from Def. 28. Finally, Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A). 
Remark 4 If Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A) then ΘP(A) ⊆ Att(TP(A)).
Proposition 22 Given a de.l.p. P, a warranting incision function “σ”, and the
sets of defeasible rules Ψ1 = Σσ(ΛP(A)) and Ψ2 = Σσ(ΘP(A)), it holds Ψ2 ⊆ Ψ1
Proof: Straightforward from condition 1 in Def. 30. 
The construction of the incision-aware alteration set ΘP(A) may be skipped if
the preconditions of Theorem 10 are satisfied in the construction of the regular
alteration set ΛP(A). That is, ΛP(A) = ΘP(A) holds whenever no line in ΛP(A)
is closed by another line in the set.
Theorem 10 ΛP(A) = ΘP(A) iff ∄λ ∈ ΛP(A) such that λ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A)\{λ}).
Proof: ⇒) By reductio ad absurdum assume there is some λ ∈ ΛP(A) such that
λ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A) \ {λ}). Since ΛP(A) = ΘP(A), from Def. 30 it is clear that
λ ∈ ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)). From Prop. 18 and Def. 29, we know that λ ∈ ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \
{λ}). Afterwards, ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \ {λ}) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \ {λ}) holds, satisfying
condition 2 from Def. 30. Thus, since condition 3 ends up violated, the set ΘP(A)
does not conform Def. 30, reaching the absurdity.
⇐) We have that for every λ ∈ ΛP(A), it holds λ /∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A) \ {λ}). From
Def. 30, we know ΘP(A) ⊆ ΛP(A), thus we need to show that ΛP(A) ⊆ ΘP(A). By
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reductio ad absurdum, we assume there is some λ ∈ ΛP(A) such that λ /∈ ΘP(A).
But then, from Def. 30, we know λ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A) \ {λ}), which is absurd. 
Lemma 9 For any λ ∈ ΛP(A) and any λ′ ∈ ΛP(A), if [λ′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ)] →
[σ(γ(λ)) = σ(γ(λ′))] and λ ∈ ΘP(A) then ⊙[P,A](λ) ∩ΘP(A) = {λ}.
Proof: From Prop. 17, we know λ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ), thus λ ∈ (⊙[P,A](λ) ∩ΘP(A)). By
reductio ad absurdum, let us assume there is some line λ′ ∈ (⊙[P,A](λ) ∩ ΘP(A)),
such that λ 6= λ′. Since λ ∈ ΘP(A), from Def. 30, λ ∈ ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) and λ ∈
⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)). We also have that λ
′ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)). From hypothesis we know
that σ(γ(λ)) = σ(γ(λ′)) holds. It is clear that every line that is open (resp., closed)
by λ′ is also open (resp., closed) by λ. Hence, ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) = ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \
{λ′}), and if ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A)) holds so it does ⊚̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \
{λ′}) ⊆ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \ {λ
′}). Since this is contrary to condition 3 from Def. 30,
we reach an absurdity. Finally ⊙[P,A](λ) ∩ΘP(A) = {λ}. 
The following theorem states under which conditions the attacking set, alter-
ation set, and incision-aware alteration set, determine the same sets of rules to be
removed. That is, Σσ(Att(TP (A))) = Σσ(ΛP(A)) = Σσ(ΘP(A)) holds when both
conditions 1 and 2 from Theorem 11 are satisfied. Condition 1 states that if there
is a line in ΛP(A) closed through a regular collaterality function (Def. 27) by an-
other line in ΛP(A), then their incisions coincide. Observe that this is part of the
preconditions required in Lemma 9. On the other hand, condition 2, states that if a
line in ΛP(A) is closed through a context-sensitive collaterality function (Def. 29)
by another line in ΛP(A), then it is necessarily closed by a regular collaterality
function. Thus, the collaterality occurs over the selected argument in that line.
Theorem 11 Given the following two conditions:
1. ∀λ′ ∈ ΛP(A), ∀λ ∈ ΛP(A); if λ
′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ) then σ(γ(λ
′)) = σ(γ(λ))
2. ∀λ′ ∈ ΛP(A), ∃λ ∈ ΛP(A); if λ′ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A)\{λ
′}) then λ′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ)
and λ 6= λ′
If both 1 and 2 hold then Σσ(Att(TP (A))) = Σσ(ΛP(A)) = Σσ(ΘP(A)).
Proof: From Def. 30, we know ΘP(A) ⊆ ΛP(A), and hence, it is easy to see
that Σσ(ΘP(A)) ⊆ Σσ(ΛP(A)) holds. Thus, we need to show that Σσ(ΛP(A)) ⊆
Σσ(ΘP(A)) also holds. We will assume (a) there is some λ ∈ ΛP(A) and some
λ′ ∈ ΛP(A) such that λ′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ) and λ 6= λ
′. From Lemma 9, we know that if
λ ∈ ΘP(A) then λ′ /∈ ΘP(A) holds. However, since σ(γ(λ′)) = σ(γ(λ)), we know
that σ(γ(λ′)) ⊆ Σσ(ΘP(A)). On the other hand, if λ /∈ ΘP(A) and λ′ /∈ ΘP(A)
then from cond. 2 we know for every λ′′ ∈ ΛP(A) there is some λ′′′ ∈ ΛP(A)
such that if λ′′ ∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A) \ {λ
′′}) then λ′′ ∈ ⊙[P,A](λ
′′′) and λ′′ 6= λ′′′. But
then, it follows that either (1) λ′′ /∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΛP(A) \ {λ
′′}) or (2) λ′′ /∈ ΘP(A) and
λ′′′ /∈ ΘP(A). For the latter case, observe that for every λ ∈ ΘP(A) it follows
that λ /∈ ⊙̂[P,A](ΘP(A) \ {λ}) and hence ΘP(A) = ΛP(A) (see Theorem 10). The
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former case is similar, and in case (a) is not satisfied, then we will also be satisfying
ΘP(A) = ΛP(A). Finally, Σσ(ΛP(A)) = Σσ(ΘP(A)) holds.
Besides, since cond. 1 conforms the preconditions of Theorem 9, Att(TP (A)) =
ΛP(A) holds, and hence, Σσ(Att(TP (A))) = Σσ(ΛP(A)) is also satisfied. 
Example 21 Considering Ex. 20, and assuming ϕ3 = ϕ4 = ϕ5, the conditions of
Theorem 11 are satisfied. Observe that σ(γ(λ1)) = σ(γ(λ2)) = σ(γ(λ3)). It is clear
that Att(TP (A)) = ΛP(A), and that ΘP(A) may be any singleton containing either
λ1, λ2, or λ3. As stated by Theorem 11, the set of rules to remove from the de.l.p.
would be the same for any of the sets, Att(TP (A)), ΛP(A), or ΘP(A).
As a consequence of the properties shown, from now on we will only rely on the
incision-aware alteration set to formalize the upcoming change operations.
5.4 Argument Change Operators
The argument expansion can be defined in a simple manner by just adding the
necessary rules to activate the desired argument; formally:
Definition 32 (Argument Expansion) An argument expansion operation
P +△A over a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) by an argument A from either ArgsP or XargsP ,
is defined as follows:
P +△A = (Π,∆ ∪A)
Note that not only argument A is activated, but the addition of A’s rules to ∆
could cause the automatic activation of many other arguments. This is part of the
dynamism of the theory. Moreover, the definition of the argument expansion has
the inherent implications to expansions within any non-monotonic formalism: de-
spite of the set of arguments Args
(P+△A)
being increased, the amount of warranted
consequences from P +△A could be diminished.
Regarding contractions, we are looking for an operator that provides warrant
for an argument A ∈ ArgsP by turning every attacking line in TP(A) to a non-
attacking line through an argument incision function σ. That is, we are going to
drop arguments towards A’s warrant. This is the reason why we call it argument
defeating contraction. Considering that the notion of consequence is warrant, we
are taking advantage of the non-monotonic nature of argumentation.
Definition 33 (Argument Defeating Contraction) An argument defeating
contraction operation P −ωA of a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) by an argument A ∈
ArgsP , is defined by means of a minimally-warranting incision function “σ” ap-
plied over selections γ(λ) for each λ ∈ ΘP(A) in the incision-aware alteration set
of TP(A), as follows:
P−ωA = (Π,∆ \ Σσ(ΘP(A)))
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An argument revision operator should firstly add to the program the new argu-
ment for which warrant is to be achieved. Afterwards, a warrant contraction should
be applied. Note that in case the argument was already warranted, the contraction
would produce no change since the alteration set would be empty. The operation
is called argument warranting revision.
Definition 34 (Argument Warranting Revision) Given a DeLP program P =
(Π,∆), and an argument A from either ArgsP or XargsP , an operator “∗ω” is an
argument warranting revision iff
P∗ωA = (Π,∆′ \ Σσ(ΘP′(A))),
where “σ” is a minimally-warranting incision, ΘP′(A) is the incision-aware alter-
ation set of TP′(A), and P
′ = (Π,∆′) with ∆′ = ∆ ∪A.
In belief revision, revisions and contractions may be defined one in terms of
the other by means of the Levy identity (Levi 1977). In this model of change,
Definition 34 can be rewritten in terms of an argument expansion and a defeating
contraction as an analogy of the reversed Levi identity (Hansson 1993), which we
have called the argument change identity.
(Argument Change Identity) P ∗ωA = (P +△A) −ωA
In this revision the expansion has to be performed first because otherwise there
would be no argument to warrant. Besides, inconsistent intermediate states are not
an issue in this formalism, since it is based on argumentation.
Given a knowledge base P and an argument A, the next postulates stand for
the principles of inclusion, success, and minimal change, for an argument revision
operator “∗” based on alteration of dialectical trees such as ATC. A complete study
about postulates in ATC can be referred to (Moguillansky et al. 2011).
(inclusion) P ∗ A ⊆ P ∪ A.
(success) A is warranted from P ∗ A.
(core-retainment) If ϕ ∈ (P \ P ∗ A) then there is some P ′ ⊆ P such that A is
warranted from P ′ ∪A but not from P ′ ∪ A ∪ {ϕ}.
Inclusion aims at guaranteeing that no other new information beyond the one
conforming argument A will be included to the de.l.p. Success states that the
new information to be incorporated should be accepted by the worked argumenta-
tion semantics, i.e., the new argument should end up warranted. Core-retainment
was originally introduced in (Hansson 1991) and then it was adapted for revision
in (Hansson 1997; Hansson and Wassermann 2002). Through this postulate, the
amount of change is controlled by avoiding removals that are not related to the
revision, i.e., every rule ϕ lost serves to the acceptation of the new argument. This
means that ϕ is removed in order to achieve an effective alteration.
Assuming the knowledge base P as a de.l.p., the argument A corresponding to
either ArgsP or XargsP , and associating the abstract argument revision operator
“∗” as the one given in Definition 34; the proposed argument revision operator “∗ω”
upon de.l.p.s is shown to satisfy the given postulates.
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Theorem 12 Given a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) and the external argument A ∈ XargsP ,
if “∗ω” is an argument revision operator then P∗ωA satisfies inclusion, success,
and core-retainment.
Proof: We know “σ” is minimally-warranting (Def. 34) thus satisfying preservation
(Def. 31 and Def. 25) and thus strict preservation (see Prop. 14). Hence, inclusion
is satisfied. Success and core-retainment follow from Theorem 6 and Theorem 7. 
6 Towards an Implementation for ATC
In this section we present several examples of minimal change criteria, and after-
wards introduce a prolog-like algorithm that illustrates an implementation of the
argument revision operator, as defined in Section 5.
6.1 Minimal Change Criteria Exemplified
We have defined how ATC relies on the minimal change principle, which specifies
the way change is evaluated. Following this principle, particular minimal change
criteria can be developed in order to establish a specific way of measuring change.
In this section we propose some of these criteria. Additionally, we will address the
third axis of change mentioned in Section 5, by considering restrictions over the
relation between selections and incisions for each proposed criterion. These restric-
tions make use of the properties previously defined in this article, like cautiousness,
(weak) profitability and strict preservation. The attachment of a restriction to each
criterion represents just an example, and is not intended to be formal nor definitive.
That is, additional restrictions could be posed to achieve the desired behavior for
these criteria, as well as none.
Preserving Program Rules
In general, when looking to remove as few rules as possible, selecting direct defeaters
of the root argument ensures a minimal deletion of defeasible rules from the de.l.p.
This is so because the deletion of a root’s defeater eliminates a whole subtree.
Trying to achieve the same result by deleting rules from “lower” arguments in the
tree would affect a greater amount of arguments, due to possible branching. We
will make incisions only over those direct defeaters that are undefeated, i.e., those
belonging to attacking lines, since the ones that are defeated do not compromise
the warrant of the root.
Rules-Preserving Selection Criterion. Given a line λ ∈ SP (A) where SP (A)
determines TP(A), ≺λ = {(B1,B2) | B1 ∈ λ−,B2 ∈ λ−, and B1 ∈ λ↑(B2)}
An interesting restriction is to seek for profitable incisions, i.e., those that have
a collateral incision with a selection in another line. Such an incision is desirable,
since it would not only save a future incision, but would also collaborate with the
criterion by preventing the deletion of extra rules.
Note that, in pursuit of profitability, this criterion could be relaxed to allow
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selections to be mapped to arguments placed at lower positions in the line. This is
performed by updating the order, as shown before. However, the question remains
about how much effort should be put on this re-ordering. Should we go for the best
combination (select as high as possible capturing shared incisions) risking to end up
deleting more rules? Or should there be specific boundaries beyond which dropping
the search ends up being worthier? Since computational tractability is also at stake,
a definite answer remains a matter of implementation.
Preserving the Dialectical Tree Structure
When trees are treated as an explanation for the answer given to a query (Garc´ıa et al. 2007),
they are of utmost importance, since their structure turns out to be the main source
of information. Provided that dialectical trees are the most suitable tool to trust
and understand the interrelation among arguments and their influence to the final
answer, we will define a selection criterion that determines a revision operation
making minimal changes in the structure of the temporary tree (recall this notion
was introduced on page 26) in order to render its root undefeated. Therefore, like
in Ex. 10, the selection criterion will be determined by the level of the argument
in the argumentation line; the lower an argument is, the less is its impact in the
structure of the tree, making the argument more suitable for selection. Hence, this
criterion specifies the opposite order than the rules-preserving one. In this case,
an interesting restriction would be to identify those strict-preserving incisions, that
is, incisions that do not collide with any other argument in the tree. This would
collaborate with the preservation of the tree structure. Again, strict preservation
should not be sought blindly, at the expense of the original ordering specified by
the selection criterion, but some sort of balance must be pursued instead.
Preserving Rules Without Compromising Tree Structure
Following the two principles given above, a combined approach can be studied in
order to preserve the rules of the program while minimizing the pruning of the
dialectical tree. This approach takes advantage of adjacency among attacking lines,
incising one of the arguments acting as a “common factor” for them, i.e., belonging
to the shared upper segment. In this way, the deactivation of fewer arguments is
encouraged. The principle also attempts to go as deep as possible when selecting
arguments. Thus, the amount of arguments disappearing from prunes in the tree is
diminished. Ex. 23 illustrates the usage of this criterion.
Tree-and-Rules-Preserving Selection Criterion. Given the dialectical tree
TP(A) and two lines λ1 ∈ Att(TP (A)) and λ2 ∈ Att(TP(A)) belonging to its attack-
ing set; if λ1 and λ2 are adjacent at an argument B such that there is no adjacency
point in λ↑1(B) shared with a line in Att(TP (A)), then ≺λ1 = ≺λ2 = {(B1,B2) | B1 ∈
λ−1 ,B2 ∈ λ
−
1 ,B1 ∈ λ
↑
1[B], and B2 ∈ λ
↑
1(B1)}
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Preserving Semantics
In addition to the principles given above, we could consider to produce the least
possible modifications to the semantics of the defeasible logic program. The set
of warranted arguments would be preserved at the highest possible degree, while
satisfying some minimal change criterion. A way to implement this would be not
consider warranted arguments as candidates for deactivation. It might be the case
that the deactivation of some arguments could be unavoidable. In such a case,
there would be a compromise between the chosen criterion and the preservation
of semantics, leading to an update of the selection criterion. For instance, if we
attempt to preserve the structure of the tree while not harming the set of warranted
arguments, we define:
Semantics-Preserving Selection Criterion. Given a line λ ∈ SP (A) where
SP(A) determines TP(A), ≺λ = {(B1,B2) | B1 ∈ λ−,B2 ∈ λ−, and B2 ∈ λ↑(B1)
and neither B1 nor B2 are warranted from P}
Example 22
Consider the program P1 being revised by argument A and the correspond-
ing temporary tree of Ex. 5. The criterion trying to preserve program rules
would select arguments B1 and B2. From Ex. 11, we know that there is a way
of incising B1 while collaterally incising B2, which is σ(B1) = {∼a –≺y}.
Therefore, the resulting tree is as depicted on the right, and the revised pro-
gram would lose just one rule: P1R = (Π1,∆1 ∪ {A} \ {∼a –≺y}).
Following the tree-preserving minimal change principle, lower
selections are considered first, thus the selected arguments are B1
and B4. Now the incision over B1 will avoid collateral incisions,
i.e., will be strict-preserving; hence, σ(B1) = {y –≺x}. Since B4 is
a cautious selection (see Ex. 11) and has one rule, the only pos-
sible incision is: σ(B4) = {∼w –≺ t}. Finally, the resulting tree is
as depicted on the right, and its corresponding program is: P2R =
(Π1,∆1 ∪ {A} \ {(y –≺x), (∼w –≺ t)}).
Example 23 Let consider a modification of the program P1 used in Ex. 22:
P23 = (Π1,∆1 ∪


(a –≺x), (x –≺z),
(b –≺∼a), (∼a –≺p),
(∼b –≺ t), (b –≺z)

)
If we revise P23 by A = 〈{∼b –≺p},∼b〉, we can build the temporary dialecti-
cal tree depicted below, annotated with the defeasible rules used in each argument.
Following the rules-preserving criterion, the argument to be incised would be
B1 = 〈{b –≺z}, b〉, that is, the revision would consist of adding the rule from A and
deleting the single rule from B1.
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If the chosen minimal change criterion
attempts to preserve the tree structure,
B5 = 〈{(∼a –≺y), (y –≺x), (x –≺z)},∼a〉 and
B10 = 〈{∼w –≺ t},∼w〉 are selected. The
unique choice to incise B10 does not col-
lide with any other argument, that is, it
satisfies the requirement of being strict-
preserving. The only possible incision over
B5 is (y –≺x), as the other rules are shared
with B4 and B6.
When considering the combined crite-
rion that attempts to preserve both the
tree structure and program rules, there
would be two choices: B1 and B3. These
are the only con arguments belonging to the
shared segment of the two attacking lines in
the tree. Finally, the criterion chooses the lowest one in the line aiming to preserve
the tree structure; that is, B3. Note that this argument does not intersect with any
other argument in the tree and, therefore, this is a clean incision.
6.2 An Algorithm for Argument Revision
Next, we present a prolog-like program as an approach for an implementation
of argument revision. The given algorithms constitute part of the implementation
that we are currently working in towards the first fully implemented ATC approach.
A computational complexity analysis is underway. However, we believe that such
a detailed analysis would fall out of the scope of this article: the main objective
in this section is to show how the proposed theory can be easily implemented in
prolog-like programs by taking advantage of some distinctive characteristics of
the logic paradigm like backtracking.
In Algorithm 14, the main predicate is revise/3, which takes a program and
an (possibly external) argument, performs the revision, and returns the revised
program. The algorithm begins by inserting argument A into the set of defeasible
rules of P, obtaining a set ∆A. Next, it asserts facts line/1 (through predicate
assert lines/2), one per line in the tree rooted in A, each of which holds a list rep-
resenting a sequence of arguments. Then, from those facts, it initializes the selection
orders according to the criterion through predicate initialize selection orders/0,
which asserts facts order/2 mapping lines to the ordering assigned to their in-
terference sets. Afterwards, the algorithm recognizes the subset of lines belonging
to the attacking set of the tree and asserts facts attacking/1, through predicate
assert att set/0.
Predicate get incisions/0 first gathers all incisions and selections by asserting
facts incision/3, one per line, through the call to predicate get alteration/1. Then,
4 Note that every symbol in the program is a variable, i.e., there are no atoms.
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Algorithm 1 Argument Revision
Input: de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) and an argument 〈A, α〉
Output: Revised de.l.p. P∗ωA = (Π,∆R)
revise((Π,∆), 〈A, α〉, (Π,∆R)) ←
union(∆,A,∆A),
assert lines((Π,∆A),A), %facts line/1
initialize selection orders, %facts order/2
assert att set, %facts attacking/1
get incisions,
get inc aware alteration set(ΘP (A)),
findall(σ, (member(λ,ΘP (A)), incision(σ, , λ)),Σ),
subtract(∆A,Σ,∆R).
get incisions←
retractall(incision( , , )),
forall(line(λ), get alteration(λ)),
forall(line(λ), preservation(λ)), !,
(not(update order wrt upper( , )); update orders, get incisions).
get alteration(λ) ←
select(γ, λ),
incise(σ, γ),
assert(incision(σ, γ, λ)).
preservation(λ′) ←
incision(σ′, , λ′),
forall(get upmost collateral(σ′, λ,B),
(incision(σ, γ, λ), in upper segment(γ,B, λ)
;
assert(update order wrt upper(λ,B))).
select(λ, γ) ←
order(λ, [γ| ]).
selections and incisions in every line are checked to satisfy the preservation principle.
Whenever some line does not satisfy preservation, the order there has to be updated
through predicate update order wrt upper/2, which removes from order/2 those
pairs including an argument below the collateral incision, so that the selection is
restricted to the collateral incision’s upper segment, and get incisions/0 is invoked
again. This iterative process ends when the current selection orders yield incisions
satisfying preservation. The algorithm always terminates because there is always a
configuration of incisions and selections that satisfies this principle (see Theorem 4).
Once all the selections and incisions are verified against preservation, the incision-
aware alteration set of the tree at issue is calculated through the predicate
get inc aware alteration set/1, and for each line in it, the incisions are gathered
into a set Σ, which is afterwards removed from the set ∆A of defeasible rules, thus
obtaining the revised program (Π,∆R).
Algorithm 2 shows the predicates to obtain the incision-aware alteration set of
a dialectical tree TP (A) through predicate get inc aware alteration set/1. This
predicate firstly computes the alteration set Θ (get alteration set/2) and then,
for every candidate X in Θ’s power set (which is sorted by cardinality), checks
whether they comply with the condition of having the context sensitive open set
within the context-sensitive closed set. When this property is satisfied, X ’s super-
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sets are marked in order to avoid its evaluation. After all the candidate sets of lines
(minimal wrt. ⊆) are obtained, their sets of incisions are calculated and then com-
pared among them to get the one that yields the least amount of change, according
to the rule-based criterion adopted. Regarding the computation of the power set
of the alteration set, a few optimizations can be done, following properties from
Section 5.3. For instance, this would allow us to greatly simplify the computation
of the incision-aware alteration set, whenever we recognise the conditions stated by
Theorems 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Predicates context open/3 and context closed/2 respond to their corresponding
definitions. The former gathers all lines that are open by lines in X and then
performs the union with the attacking set; the latter includes every line in the tree
such that it receives a collateral incision over its selection, and any other collateral
incision does not affect the selection’s upper segment.
Algorithm 2 Incision-aware Alteration Set
get inc aware alteration set(IncAwareSet)←
retractall(avoid supersets( )),
get open set(⊚[P,A]),
get alteration set(⊚[P,A],ΛP (A)),
powerset(ΛP(A), P ),
findall(X,
(member(X, P ),
inc aware(⊚[P,A],X),
assert(avoid supersets(X))),
MinSubsets),
minimal change(MinSubsets, [IncAwareSet| ]).
inc aware(⊚[P,A], X) ←
not((avoid supersets(S), subset(S,X))),
context open(⊚[P,A],X, ⊚̂[P,A]),
context closed(X, ⊙̂[P,A]),
subset(⊚̂[P,A], ⊙̂[P,A]).
context open(⊚[P,A],X, CO) ←
findall(OL,
(member(o(O,OL),⊚[P,A]), member(O,X)),
F ),
flatten(F,XOpen), attacking set(Att), append(Att,XOpen,CO).
context closed(X,CC) ←
lines(Lines),
findall(λ′,
(member(λ′, Lines),
member(λ,X),
selection(λ, S), incision(S, I),
con args(λ′, Con), member(C, Con), rules in(C, Cr),
intersection(I, Cr,NonEmpty), NonEmpty\ = [],
forall(member(λ′′, X),
(selection(λ′′, S2), incision(S2, I2),
args(λ′, LPargs),member(B, LPargs), rules in(B, Br),
intersection(I2, Br,NonEmpty2),
(NonEmpty2\ = [],
upper segment(B, λ′, U), member(C, U)
; true))
)), CC).
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Algorithm 3 Strict Preservation
get incisions←
retractall(incision( , , )),
forall(line(λ), get alteration),
forall(line(λ), strict preservation(λ)),
(not(update to next selection( ))
;
update orders wrt strict preservation, get incisions).
strict preservation(λ′) ←
incision(σ′, γ′, λ′),
forall((get upmost collateral(σ′, λ,B),B 6= γ′),
(B = []
;
assert(update to next selection(λ′)))).
In addition to preservation, we give the alternative to pursue extra restrictions to
control the third axis of change, regarding the desired behavior of incisions and se-
lections. Algorithm 3 shows another rule for predicate get incisions/0, intending to
achieve a selection plus incision satisfying strict preservation, i.e., an incision which
does not collaterally affect any argumentation line. In this case, the convention is
that get upmost collateral/3 returns in B an empty list. Whenever the original
order does not meet this condition (i.e., B 6= []), the order is updated and strict
preservation is checked again, until an order satisfies this principle or an update
is no longer possible. That is, unlike preservation, the strict preservation principle
could fail to be satisfied. It is important to note that once strict preservation is sat-
isfied, so is preservation (see Proposition 14.2) and thus, there is no need to check
if the latter holds. In case strict preservation fails, the revision procedure should be
restarted to meet only preservation.
Algorithm 4 implements profitability, which requires collateral incisions to affect
selections in lines belonging to the attacking set. Again, if a given selection in a line
does not satisfy profitability, an update of the order is asserted for that line.
Algorithm 4 Profitability
get incisions←
retractall(incision( , , )),
forall(line(λ), get alteration),
forall(line(λ), profitability(λ)),
(not(update selection to collinc( , ))
;
update orders wrt profitability, get incisions).
profitability(λ′) ←
incision(σ′, γ′, λ′),
forall((get upmost collateral(σ′, λ,B),B 6= γ′),
(attacking(λ), incision(σ,B, λ)
;
assert(update selection to collinc(λ,B)))).
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7 Related Work
In general, there is no literature directly related to Argument Theory Change,
although some authors have developed systems that relate belief revision and ar-
gumentation (Cayrol et al. 2008; Boella et al. 2008a). One of the papers closely re-
lated to our approach studies revision of logic programs (Delgrande et al. 2008).
Next, we will describe several approaches and their relation to our work. Afterwards,
we will briefly introduce the article (Moguillansky et al. 2011) which presents a
variant of ATC applied to propositional argumentation.
Regarding ideas from the classic belief revision theory applied to non-monotonic
theories, in (Billington et al. 1999), the authors study the dynamics of a simpler
variant of defeasible logic through the definition of expansion, revision and con-
traction operators. Here, a defeasible theory contains facts, defeasible rules and
defeaters. The first two elements are similar to those in DeLP, whereas defeaters
are rules that, instead of being used to draw conclusions, they prevent their achieve-
ment. The focus of the paper, unlike the approach we presented, is to provide a full
account of postulates, which are closely related to those from the AGM model. The
intuitions behind each operator do not need any special consideration, and each one
of them is formally checked to comply with the corresponding set of postulates.
(Benferhat et al. 1995) presented an article primarily oriented towards the treat-
ment of inconsistency caused by the use of multiple sources of information. Knowl-
edge bases are stratified, namely each formula in the knowledge base is associated
with its level of certainty corresponding to the layer to which it belongs. They
suggest that it is not necessary to restore consistency in order to make sensible in-
ferences from an inconsistent knowledge base. Likewise, argumentation-based infer-
ence can derive conclusions supported by reasons to believe in them, independently
of the consistency of the knowledge base.
(Pollock and Gillies 2000) studied the dynamic of a belief revision system con-
sidering relations among beliefs in a “derivational approach” trying to obtain a
theory of belief revision from a more concrete epistemological theory. According to
them, one of the goals of belief revision is to generate a knowledge base in which
each piece of information is justified (by perception) or warranted by arguments
containing previously held beliefs. The difficulty is that the set of justified beliefs
can exhibit all kinds of logical incoherences because it represents an intermediate
stage in reasoning. Therefore, they propose a theory of belief revision concerned
with warrant rather than justification.
(Falappa et al. 2002) proposed a kind of non-prioritized revision operator based
on the use of explanations. The idea is that an agent, before incorporating infor-
mation that is inconsistent with its knowledge, requests an explanation supporting
it. They presented a framework oriented to defeasible reasoning. One of the most
interesting ideas of this work is the generation of defeasible conditionals from a
revision process. This approach preserves consistency in the strict knowledge and
it provides a mechanism to dynamically qualify the beliefs as strict or defeasible.
(Paglieri and Castelfranchi 2006) joined argumentation and belief revision in the
same conceptual framework, highlighting the important role played by Toulmin’s
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layout of argument in fostering such integration. They consider argumentation as
“persuasion to believe” and this restriction is useful to make more explicit the
connection with belief revision. They propose a model of belief dynamics alternative
to the AGM approach: data-oriented belief revision (DBR). Two basic informational
categories (data and beliefs) are put forward in their model, to account for the
distinction between pieces of information that are simply gathered and stored by
the agent (data), and pieces of information that the agent considers (possibly up to
a certain degree) truthful representations of states of the world (beliefs). Whenever
a new piece of evidence is acquired through perception or communication, it affects
directly the agent’s data structure and only indirectly his beliefs. Belief revision is
often triggered by information update either on a fact or on a source: the agent
receives a new piece of information, rearranges his data structure accordingly, and
possibly changes his beliefs.
(Boella et al. 2008a) showed a direct relation between argumentation and belief
revision. They consider argumentation as persuasion to believe and that persuasion
should be related to belief revision. More recently, (Boella et al. 2008b) presented
the interrelation between argumentation and belief revision on multi-agent systems.
When an agent uses an argument to persuade another one, he must consider not
only the proposition supported by the argument, but also the overall impact of the
argument on the beliefs of the addressee.
(Cayrol et al. 2008) proposed a revision theory upon Dung-style abstract argu-
mentation systems. The main issue of any argumentation system is the selection of
acceptable sets of arguments. An argumentation semantics defines the properties
required for a set of arguments to be acceptable. The selected sets of arguments
under a given semantics are called extensions of that semantics. Then, by consider-
ing how the set of extensions is modified under the revision process, they propose
a typology of different revisions: decisive revision and expansive revision. A strong
restriction is posed: the newly added argument must have at most one interaction
(via attack) with an argument in the system. This restriction greatly simplifies the
revision problem, as multiple interactions with the original system are more com-
mon to occur, and could become difficult to handle. In ATC, this is addressed with
the inclusion of subarguments and through the handle of collateralities. Moreover,
the objective of (Cayrol et al. 2008) differs from ours in that we apply (assuming it
is allowed) additional change to the original argumentative framework (and conse-
quently, to the de.l.p.) pursuing warrant of a single argument through the analysis
of dialectical trees, whereas they study how the addition of a given argument would
affect the set of extensions, by looking at an arguments graph.
(Delgrande et al. 2008) address the problem of belief revision in (non-monotonic)
logic programming under answer set semantics: given two logic programs P and Q,
the goal is to determine a program R that corresponds to the revision of P by Q,
denoted P ∗ Q. They proposed formal techniques analogous to those of distance-
based belief revision in propositional logic. They investigate two specific operators:
(logic program) expansion and a revision operator based on the distance between
the SE models of logic programs. However, our approach is very different. First, we
use defeasible logic programs instead of logic programs: it is clear that defeasible
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logic programs are more general and more expressive than logic programs. Second,
since we want an external argument A to end up undefeated after the revision, we
must modify the defeasible logic program so that the conclusion of A is warranted.
7.1 ATC Applied to Propositional Argumentation
In the recently published article (Moguillansky et al. 2011), ATC is applied to a
propositional argumentation framework (AF) with the objective of dealing with
the dynamics of knowledge of an underlying inconsistent propositional KB from
where the AF is built. Thus, similarly to the proposal given in the present arti-
cle, handling dynamics of arguments of the AF allows to deal with the dynamics
of knowledge of the underlying inconsistent KB. The main difference regarding
the utilized KBs is that in this article de.l.p.s are used as a kind of KB, while
in (Moguillansky et al. 2011), a potentially inconsistent propositional KB is given
in a more classical way.
A set of rationality postulates adapted to argumentation is also given, and there-
fore, the proposed model of change is related to the postulates through the corre-
sponding representation theorem. (Moguillansky et al. 2011) constitutes the main
ATC approach given that it is fully axiomatizated within the theory of belief revi-
sion. Nevertheless, the theory proposed in the present article introduces an impor-
tant result regarding the application of ATC to an implemented sort of argumen-
tation system: DeLP.
In contrast to the ATC model upon which we rely in this article, the alteration of
dialectical trees in (Moguillansky et al. 2011) is achieved according to an alternative
but more general viewpoint: incisions are applied globally to the dialectical tree,
and therefore, no selection function is needed to determine a precise argument from
each argumentation line to which the incision is applied. Hence, a global incision
function determines a possible set of beliefs to be removed in order to effectively
alter all the necessary lines at once.
The usage of a selection function in the present article, allows to specify different
criteria of minimal change as has been introduced in Section 6: removing as few
beliefs as possible from the de.l.p., altering as few argumentation lines as possible
from the tree, and preserving the tree structure as much as possible by removing
arguments placed as low as possible in each line, getting closer to the leaves.
In addition, the model presented in (Moguillansky et al. 2011) does not pursue
such an extensive variety of minimal change criteria as the ones discussed here, but
only avoids to lose beliefs that are not related to the revision through the postulate
of core-retainment (see page 48). Moreover, it is important to remark that the
notion of minimality is usually subjective: most approaches in classic belief revision
do not obtain real minimality, but approximations to it by specifying different
criteria interpreting the meaning of minimal change as we have done in this article.
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8 Conclusions
Argument Theory Change is an abstract formalism that applies the concept of re-
vision from classic theory change to argumentation. Concretely, ATC looks for the
incorporation of a new argument to the current argumentation theory, upon which
it performs the necessary modifications in order for the newly inserted argument to
end up warranted. In this article we focus on an implemented, working argumen-
tation system: Defeasible Logic Programming. In DeLP, arguments are built from
sets of rules, checked for minimality and consistency, and warrant of an argument
is determined by building and evaluating a dialectical tree. All these elements were
taken into account in this reification of ATC, yielding a very detailed version of
it. Given the specific nature of this approach, Section 4 was devoted to study the
properties of the DeLP marking procedure utilized to evaluate dialectical trees.
These results constitute the foundations for elements presented afterwards.
The complete change machinery was addressed in Section 5: the classical notions
of selection and incision were redefined in terms of ATC, and the argumentation-
related difficulties (namely, collateral incisions), controlled by proper, concrete prin-
ciples. Desirable properties were also analyzed, characterizing certain combinations
of selections/incisions. Special attention was paid to the determination of what ar-
gumentation lines to alter within the dialectical tree at issue. This alteration set
was thoroughly investigated from the somewhat na¨ıve notion of attacking set up to
the evolved concept of incision-aware alteration set, which minimizes the amount of
incisions performed to the tree. Interrelations among these different kinds of sets of
lines to be altered were studied, and also their relation to several properties; some
of these results would be useful in the implementation.
The necessary change operations composing the argument warranting revision
were provided in Section 5 for an external argument (an argument that cannot be
built from the worked de.l.p. P and that only derives its claim when considering the
set of strict rules from P). Regarding the main formal results, the paper provides
justifications for the classification of argumentation lines, and also to ensure the
correctness of the revision operators. The latter assertion refers to the two main
objectives pursued throughout this article: (1) change de.l.p.s in a controlled manner
(through some kind of minimal change) towards (2) achieving warrant for the claim
of the newly inserted argument. We proposed both objectives to refer to two well-
known principles of change in the classic theory of belief revision: persistence of prior
knowledge and primacy of new information, respectively, as originally introduced
in (Dalal 1988). Both principles were addressed through the proposal of two of
the usual postulates from belief revision readapted to argumentation theory: core-
retainment and success.
Finally, Section 6 addresses the implementation of ATC over DeLP. Several
minimal change principles are proposed and discussed, clarifying the intuitive ideas
given throughout the article. Most importantly, a prolog-like algorithm is pro-
vided, showing a possible implementation for the argument revision operator. The
main operations are given in detail and optimizations are suggested, by following
the properties established in Section 5, specially those relieving the potential ex-
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haustiveness when looking for the subset of lines representing the incision-aware
alteration set. Within certain conditions this computation could be even avoided.
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